OECD and the regulation on Business and Human Rights : an evaluation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by Uusitalo, Tiina
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OECD and the regulation on Business and Human 
Rights: an evaluation of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tiina Uusitalo 
Helsingin yliopisto 
Oikeustieteellinen tiedekunta 
Pro gradu -tutkielma  
Kansainvälinen oikeus 
Lokakuu 2019 
 
 
Ohjaaja: Jan Klabbers 
 
Tiedekunta - Fakultet - Faculty 
Faculty of Law 
Laitos - Institution - Department 
 
Tekijä - Författare - Author 
Tiina Uusitalo 
Työn nimi - Arbetets titel 
OECD and the regulation on Business and Human Rights: an evaluation of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises 
 
Title 
 
Oppiaine - Läroämne - Subject 
International Law 
Työn laji/ Ohjaaja - Arbetets art/Handledare - Level/Instructor 
Master’s Thesis / Jan Klabbers 
Aika - Datum - Month and year 
10/2019 
Sivumäärä - Sidoantal - Number of 
pages 
65 pp + 6 appendices 
Tiivistelmä - Referat – Abstract 
 
The globalisation has positively affected the global economy, trade and labour possibilities. It has also 
caused a change in the global governance, where the sovereign states are no longer the sole actors in the 
field of international law. However, the international law has not evolved in the same pace as the world. 
In the power play with the States are international organisations and private entities such as corporations, 
sometimes larger in resources than of the States where they operate. 
 
The research question of the thesis is: “How does the OECD regulate business and human rights?” The 
aim of this thesis is to examine the OECD Guidelines on multinational enterprises and human rights and 
the emerging role of the organization in global governance as a standard setter. The thesis will not only 
discuss the guidelines as a recommendation from the OECD, but also the normative power OECD’s soft 
law initiatives and national policy assessments have in national policy-making.   
 
The research was conducted by analysing relevant legal documents and literature. 
  
The result of this research is that multinational enterprise’s responsibility to protect human rights cannot 
be sufficiently answered through traditional international law. The better option to provide protection for 
individuals is through binding treaty or soft law initiatives. At the moment the most potential tool for 
regulating corporate conduct are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  
 
In order for the Guidelines to ensure effective protection, some amendments would be required. The 
Guidelines and the National Contact Points (NCP) are a weak authority and they are voluntary by their 
nature. The conclusion of this research project is that in order to make the Guidelines more effective the 
governments adhering to them would have to engage more in the implementation process, e.g. taking part 
in peer review processes, promoting the Guidelines, strengthening their NCPs and imposing material 
sanctions to the enterprises failing to cooperate. 
Avainsanat - Nyckelord 
 
Keywords 
OECD– multinational enterprises – Human Rights –  Corporate Social Responsibility 
Säilytyspaikka - Förvaringsställe - Where deposited 
 
Muita tietoja - Övriga uppgifter - Additional information 
 
 
 I 
Contents 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ II	  
1	   INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1	  
2	   HUMAN RIGHTS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES ............................. 7	  
2.1	   Changing roles in international law .................................................................. 7	  
2.2	   States as the primary subjects of international law ........................................... 9	  
2.2.1	   Extraterritoriality of State duties ........................................................... 11	  
2.3	   Multinational Enterprises ................................................................................ 14	  
2.3.1	   Introduction ........................................................................................... 14	  
2.3.2	   The role of multinational enterprises in international law .................... 15	  
2.3.3	   Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights ....................................... 18	  
2.4	   Concluding remarks ........................................................................................ 23	  
3	   OECD AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE .............................................................. 25	  
3.1	   Introduction ..................................................................................................... 25	  
3.2	   OECD as an International organisation .......................................................... 26	  
3.3	   The authoritative power of the OECD ............................................................ 32	  
3.3.1	   Governance through identity ................................................................. 32	  
3.3.2	   Governance through knowledge-production ......................................... 35	  
3.3.3	   Authority of the OECD – an example: The PISA ................................. 38	  
3.4	   Concluding remarks ........................................................................................ 41	  
4	   OECD AND THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON HUMAN RIGHTS ...... 43	  
4.1	   OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ............................................ 43	  
4.1.1	   Background ........................................................................................... 43	  
4.1.2	   OECD guidelines today ........................................................................ 45	  
4.2	   The National Contact Points ........................................................................... 47	  
4.2.1	   Introduction ........................................................................................... 47	  
4.2.2	   Issues with the structure of the NCP system ......................................... 49	  
4.2.3	   Specific instances in the NCP ............................................................... 50	  
4.3	   The impact of the Guidelines and the NCPs on Human Rights protection .... 56	  
4.4	   How to improve the effectiveness of the OECD Guidelines? ........................ 58	  
4.4.1	   Peer reviews and awareness raising ...................................................... 58	  
4.4.2	   Effective cooperation and sanctions on non-compliance ...................... 61	  
5	   CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................... 63	  
 II 
 
Bibliography  
Table of Cases 
Reparations for injuries, Advisory Opinion [1949] ICJ Rep 174 
 
France v. Turkey [1927] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 
 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Judgement [1970] ICJ Rep 3 
 
 
Table of International Treaties and Conventions 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A 
(III) 
 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International 
Conference of American States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 
 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Council of Europe, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 
 
League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 16 December 
1920, 112 BFSP 
 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD 21 November 1997 
 
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD 14 
December 1960 
 
UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 
Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544 
 
Table of UN Documents 
International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its 53rd session, A/56/10, August 2001, UN GAOR, Article 4  
 
 
The United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 2011 
 
 III 
United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/60/147, Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 16 December 200, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
 
Table of OECD Documents 
OECD, OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, 
21 June 1976 Paris 
 
—   Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones 
(OECD Publishing 2006) 
 
—   Measuring Globalisation: Economic Globalisation Indicators (OECD Publishing 
2010) <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264084360-
en.pdf?expires=1568373338&id=id&accname=ocid194948&checksum=D2377
14C04F6F0701EE884F562093A09>, accessed 23 September 2019 
 
—   ‘Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(2011) 
 
—   Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) 
 
—   Rules of Procedure of the Organisation (2013)  
 
—    Implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: The National 
Contact Points from 2000 to 2015 (2016) 
<https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-report-15-years-National-Contact-
Points.pdf>, accessed 19 September 2019 
 
—   Annual Report on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2017  
(2018) <https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/2017-Annual-Report-MNE-Guidelines-
EN.pdf> , accessed 2 July 2019 
 
—   Education at a Glance 2018: OECD Indicators (OECD Publishing 2018) 
<https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/eag-2018-
en.pdf?expires=1566287534&id=id&accname=ocid194948&checksum=5998D
FE158CF757D458F531B59B8D2B2>, accessed 20 August 2019 
 
—   Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (2018) 
 
—   Guide for OECD National Contact Points on issuing Recommendations and 
Determinations (2019) < https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/Guide-for-National-
Contact-Points-on-Recommendations-and-Determinations.pdf> accessed 27 
September 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 IV 
Table of ILO Documents 
International Labour Organization (ILO), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, June 1988 
Literature 
Alasuutari P,’The Governmentality of Consultancy and Competition: The Influence of the 
OECD’, Paper Presented at the 37th World Congress of the International Institute of 
Sociology, Stockholm 2005 
—   — and Qadir A, ‘Epistemic governance: an approach to the politics of policy-
making’ (2014) 1 European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 67 
Alston P (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005)  
Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey, E (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
Brunnée J and Toope S, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law – An international 
Account (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
Buhmann K, ‘Analysing OECD National Contact Point Statements for Guidance on 
Human Rights Due Diligence: Method, Findings and Outlook’ (2018) 36 Nordic Journal 
of Human Rights, 390 
 
Cernic J L, ‘Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (2008) 4 Hanse L. Rev. 71 
Clapham A, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 
2006) 
Clapham A and Jerbi S, ‘Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses’ 
(2001) 24 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 339 
Coicaud J-M and Heiskanen V (eds), The Legitimacy of International Organizations, 
(2001 United Nations University Press) 
Crawford J, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 
2012) 
Friedman M, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’, the New 
York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970 
Kinley D(ed), Human Rights and Corporations, Series: International Library of Essays 
on Rights (2009 Ashgate Publihing Ltd)  
 V 
Mahon R and Mcbride S, ‘Standardizing and disseminating knowledge: the role of the 
OECD in global governance’ (2009) 1 European Political Science Review, 2009 
 
McCorquodale R and Simons P, 'Responsibility beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law' (2007) 
70 Modern Law Review 598 
Muchlinski P, Multinational enterprises and the law (Oxford University Press 2007) 
Niemann D and Martens K, Soft Governance by hard fact? The OECD as a knowledge 
broker in education policy (2018) 18 Global Social Policy, 267 
Pedone A(ed.), Le pouvoir normatif de l’OCDE, Societe Française pour le Droit 
International, (Journée d'études de Paris 2014) 
Ruggie J, Just Business – Multinational corporations and human rights (W.W. Norton & 
Company Inc 2013) 
— — ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business entities’, 2008, 
A/HRC/8/5 <https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-
materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf> 
— — ‘10th OECD Roundtable On Corporate Responsibility – Updating the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, Discussion Paper, Paris 2010 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/45545887.pdf> , accessed 19 September 2019 
—   — ‘Global Governance and New Governance Theory: Lessons from Business and 
Human Rights’ (2014) 20 Global Governance, 5 
—   —  and Nelson T, Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges, (2015) 22 
Brown Journal of World Affairs, 99 
—   — ‘Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and relative autonomy’ 
(2018) 12 Regulation & Governance, 317 
Reinert K, Reinert O and Debebe G: ‘The new OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises: better but not enough’ (2016) 26 Development in Practice, 816 
 
Salzman J, ‘Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’ (2000) 21 Michigan Journal 
of International Law, 769 
—   — ‘Decentralized administrative law in the organization for economic 
cooperation and development’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems, 189 
Salomon M, Global responsibility for Human Rights – world poverty and the 
development of international law (Oxford University Press 2007)  
 VI 
Sharman J.C, Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation (2007) 55 
Political Studies, 20 
 
Shelley M, OECD National Contact Points - Better Navigating Conflict to Provide 
Remedy to Vulnerable Communities, Corporate Accountability Research, 2017, 
https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2017/05/OECD-National-
Contact-Points.pdf, 
  
Shelton D (ed.), Law, Non-Law and the Problem of Soft-Law in Commitment and 
Compliance – the role of non-binding norms in the international legal system (Oxford 
University Press 2000) 
Tams CJ, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 
Woodward R ,The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(2009 Routledge) 
Wetzel J R-M, Human Rights in Transnational Business - Translating Human Rights 
Obligations into Compliance Procedures (2016 Springer) 
Electronic references 
Blokker N, ‘International Organizations or Institutions - Implied Powers’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedias of International Law, Oxford Public International law 
<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e467?prd=EPIL >  accessed 17 September 2019 
 
Bonucci N, ‘The legal status of an OECD act and the procedure for its adoption’, 
<http://www.oecd.org/education/skills-beyond-school/31691605.pdf> ,  accessed 7 May 
2019 
 
Italian National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines (2017)  FIDH, REDRESS and 
Justice for Iran versus Iltatel S.p.A 
<https://pcnitalia.mise.gov.it/attachments/article/2035928/FIDH_et_al_vs._ITALTEL_-
Initial_assessement_to_be_published_DEF%20(7).pdf> , accessed 18 September 2019 
 
OECD, Website on International Investment <https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/oecddeclarationanddecisions.htm>, accessed 21 August 2019 
—   —Website for the National Contact 
Points,<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/>,  accessed 19 September 2019 
—   — ‘What’s the issue?’< http://mneguidelines.oecd.org >accessed 16 September 
2019   
—   — what we do and how?, www.OECD.org/whatwedoandhow, accessed 6 March 
2019 
 
OECD Watch, The State of Remedy under the OECD Guidelines, June 2019, 
<https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2019/06/State-of-Remedy-
2018-2019-06-08.pdf>   
 VII 
 
Pagani F, ‘Peer review: a tool for co-operation and change an Analysis of an OECD 
Working Method’ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/1955285.pdf> accessed 12 
September 2019 
 
Porter T and Webb M, ‘The Role of the OECD in the Orchestration of Global Knowledge 
Networks’, Paper prepared for presentation at Canadian Political Science Association 
annual meetings Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada, Wednesday May 30, 2007, 
<https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2007/Porter-Webb.pdf> 
 
Reinikainen P, ‘OECD’s Assessment Programmes: Why and How?’, in PISA, PIAAC, 
AHELO. Miksi ja miten OECD mittaa osaamista?, publication of the Finnish Ministry of 
Education and Culture, 2010:17, 
<http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/75518/okm17.pdf>, accessed 
24 September 2019 
 
Reuters, ‘Five years after Rana Plaza disaster, many workers face 'unacceptably 
dangerous' conditions’, 24 April 2018 < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-
garments-accident/five-years-after-rana-plaza-disaster-many-workers-face-
unacceptably-dangerous-conditions-idUSKBN1HU301 > accessed 16 September 2019 
 
 
Abbreviations 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICC International Criminal Court  
NCP  National Contact Point  
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
UN  United Nations 
 
 
 1 
 
1   Introduction 
“The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies in the 
governance gaps created by globalization - between the scope and impact of economic 
forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse consequences. 
These governance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by 
companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow and 
ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.”1 
In the international legal order the phenomenon most descriptive of the contemporary is 
the economic globalisation. When it is discussed in the context of Human Rights issues 
globalisation often comes across as a product of the western capitalism benefiting the rich 
and making the poor even more poor.2 On the other hand, economic globalisation has 
played a large role in creating new jobs and technology enhancing human life. In the wake 
of economic globalisation, multinational corporations have increased in size, resources 
and capital, and some are perceived to have more global power than some nation States 
in which they operate.3  
Multinational Enterprises can potentially generate growth, employment and skills in the 
state they operate. Despite this, if an enterprise fails to act responsibly, it is in a risk of 
contributing to adverse human rights, labour and environmental impacts.4  This brings up 
the question of the status of multinational corporations in the field of international law. 
International law has traditionally been recognized as law between sovereign States, 
giving only limited amount of rights and duties to private individuals. It now seems that 
there is a need for establishing an international regulatory framework for corporate 
                                                
1 John Ruggie, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business entities’ (2008) A/HRC/8/5 <https://www.business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf>, 3, accessed 16 
September 2019   
2 Margot E Salomon, Global responsibility for Human Rights – world poverty and the development of 
international law (Oxford University Press 2007) 1 
3 Celia Wells and Juanita Elias, ‘Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the 
International Stage’  in Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2005) 147 
4 OECD, ‘What’s the issue?’ <http://mneguidelines.oecd.org> accessed 16 September 2019   
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conduct.5 The conclusion that stems from the contemporary research is clear:  Due to the 
economic globalisation, international law has to find a way to reinvent itself in such a 
manner that the adequate amount of protection can be provided to individuals whether 
States, State agents or purely private entities, conduct the violations of their fundamental 
rights.  
The first part of the thesis will examine the role and the subjectivity of the multinational 
corporations in the international law. The question of multinational enterprises’ 
international legal subjectivity leads to the second question considered in this research: 
Are multinational corporations obliged under international law to protect human rights 
of people affected by their operations conducted in foreign territory? Private individuals 
already have horizontal responsibility to respect the human rights of other individuals 
under most of the Human Rights Conventions, e.g. the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. It is up to debate whether the 
responsibility to respect can be turned into a positive obligation that is mainly reserved to 
the State towards the people under its jurisdiction. 
The issue of human rights violations by corporations has been scrutinized abundantly. 
For example, in its 2006 report, the Unites Nations (UN) Special Representative surveyed 
allegations of the worst cases of corporate-related human rights harm. They occurred, 
predictably, where governance challenges were the greatest: disproportionately in low 
income countries, in countries that often had just emerged from or still were in conflict 
and in countries where the rule of law was weak and levels of corruption high.6 
For these host States, it is an economical risk to take actions against exploitative 
multinational corporations in order to protect labour standards and human rights as they 
can lose the foreign direct investment from the corporation. In the race-to-the-bottom 
multinational enterprises establish subsidiaries where it is good for their business. In their 
negotiations with the governments of host countries, their ability to “pick up and leave” 
serves them an advantage over States dependent on the multinational enterprise’s 
investment.7 “The strategies for development by international financial institutions, e.g 
                                                
5 Menno T. Kamminga - Saman Zia-Zarifi, Liability of Multinational Corporations under International 
Law, (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2000)  4 
6 John Ruggie (n 1) 6 
7 Celia Wells and Juanita Elias (n 3) 144 
 3 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, together with programmes of 
deregulation and privatization, render States even less willing to frighten off 
enterprises.”8 The aspect of extraterritorial jurisdiction being an exception to the general 
principle of international law that the state only has jurisdiction over its own territory 
means that multinational enterprises can easily escape the jurisdiction of their registration 
state when operating in a host state as the acts committed belongs to the jurisdiction of 
the said state. 9 
Currently, there are few international legal sources that regulate business and human 
rights. It is within the jurisdiction of a state under which territory the violations of 
individual’s rights have occurred to provide protection. The discussion on multinational 
enterprises and their social responsibilities, when operating internationally, emerged in 
the end half of the 20th century. The conversation on binding treaty on corporate social 
responsibility was initiated in the UN. This dialogue, however,  did not lead to an 
agreement among its member States.  
The soft law initiatives concerning corporate social responsibility emerged of in the 
1970s. One of today’s most influential initiatives was adopted by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter the OECD) in 1976. The 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter the Guidelines)10 was a part of the 
Declaration for Foreign Investment and Multinational Enterprises and it is a cornerstone 
of this respective thesis.11 
The OECD is an international organisation consisting of 36 member States. The 
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development was 
established in Paris in December 1960 (hereinafter the Paris Convention).12 According to 
Article 1 of the Paris Convention the aims of the OECD are “to achieve the highest 
sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member 
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development 
                                                
8 Ibid  
9 James Crawford, ‘Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law’ (8th edition Oxford University Press 
2012) 448 
10 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing 2011 
11 OECD, OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Publishing 
2011   
12 OECD, Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris 14 
December 1960 
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of the world economy, to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as 
non-member countries in the process of economic development and to contribute to the 
expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with 
international obligations.”13 The broad scope of the OECD objectives means that it has 
the possibility to operate in various fields of economic policies nationally as well as 
internationally.  
The Guidelines are recommendations which include principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct. They are directly addressed to multinational enterprises 
instead of member-States to the OECD, even though it is the adhering States to the OECD 
that implement them in their national legal orders.  The Guidelines have been reviewed 
several times, the most important reviews being the 2000 review and 2011 review. 
Originally the Guidelines only concerned multinational enterprises from adhering States 
operating in member-States of the OECD. This was later changed and now the 
multinational enterprises from OECD-States are expected to operate in accordance with 
the Guidelines also in Non-Member States of the OECD. 
The Guidelines have been chosen for this project because they are the only current legal 
instrument covering business and human rights with a working monitoring method. Each 
adhering state to the Guidelines is obliged to set up a National Contact Point in their 
territory to handle specific instances against corporations operating abroad. The thesis 
will discuss the flaws and the positives of this mechanism and whether there could be 
room for improvement.  
The work of the OECD is based on providing expert reports and rankings as well as 
guidance, agreements and recommendations to support the member States government’s 
work as legislators.14 Sometimes referred to as a think-tank or a rich countries club,15 the 
Organisation plays strongly on its good reputation among its members.16 The OECD 
mostly works through non-enforceable procedures and soft law initiatives. It is famous 
for its economic surveys and the Organisation has established probably the best-known 
                                                
13 ibid Article 1   
14 OECD, what we do and how <www.OECD.org/whatwedoandhow> accessed 6 March 2019 
15 Richard Woodward, ’The Organisation for Economic co-operation and development’ (Routledge Global 
Institutions 2009) 1 
16 J.C Sharman, ‘Rationalist and Constructivist Perspectives on Reputation’ 55 Political Studies 2007, 20, 
30 
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global educational review system, PISA (Programme for International Student 
Assessment). The example of PISA, which is a ranking based on tests conducted on 15 
years-old pupils of member States, illustrates that the soft means of the OECD can have 
real life implications on national level. The PISA ranking has had a major impact on the 
policies and debate about education in many of the state parties to the OECD. Despite its 
major significance, the effect PISA has had over the years is not based on any legislative 
force, as does not most of the OECD work either. Thus, it is evident that an organisation 
of experts, such as the OECD, may have an impact on legislators on national level without 
the advantage of legislative powers.  
As presented, after studying the multinational corporations in international law, the thesis 
will examine the OECD regulation on multinational enterprises and human rights and the 
emerging role of the organization in global governance as a standard setter. The thesis 
will not only discuss the guidelines as a recommendation from the OECD, but also the 
normative power OECD’s soft law initiatives and national policy assessments have in 
national policy-making.  The aim of this thesis is specifically to examine and explain the 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and discuss, whether or not the they provide 
effective protection for individuals despite they are non-enforceable in member States.  
This project examines the authority of the OECD in global governance and the methods 
it uses in its policy-making in order to influence its member States. This phenomenon is 
scrutinized for example with the help of governance theories, e.g. the epistemic 
governance theory. The research question of the thesis is: “How does the OECD regulate 
business and human rights?” The respective question has been selected because of a gap 
in judicial research, where the legislative role of the organization is not sufficiently 
studied.   
Although, the thesis will discuss the specific question of OECD’s regulatory framework 
on corporate social responsibility in Human Rights, it has to be acknowledged, that 
OECD is not the only international actor in this field. The Guiding Principles of the 
United Nations on Business and Human Rights17 and International Labour Organisation’s 
(ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
                                                
17 The United Nations, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, 2011 
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Social Policy18 will be noted in the text, but because of the scope of this project they will 
be excluded from the thesis.  
The thesis also excludes the national legislation of the adhering member States to the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, as the study does not aim to be a 
comparative legal study, but rather a study researching the global policy-making of the 
OECD in the respective issue.  The thesis will discuss the work of the OECD’s monitoring 
body (National Contact Points) which has been implemented in each adhering state, but 
does not provide a case study related to the findings. Additionally, to legal and 
international instruments, companies often have their internal codes of conduct for 
responsible behaviour. These codes of conduct also need to be excluded from this project. 
These elements would make interesting topics for future research and for a broader 
research project on their relation to the regulatory framework of the OECD. 
The thesis takes a following structure: the main question will be answered in the fourth 
chapter. Before being sufficiently able to answer the research question light has to be shed 
on the meanings of business and human rights. The second chapter of the thesis will 
discuss the connection between multinational enterprises19 and human rights issues. The 
third chapter will shed light on the nature of the OECD as an organization and its authority 
over the national policies. The fourth chapter will discuss the Guidelines and their 
efficacy in protecting human rights.  Finally, I will provide my concluding remarks in the 
chapter 5. 
The research will be conducted with doctrinal methodology using the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and relevant legal texts as the main source for the thesis. 
The aim of this thesis is to build a comprehensive picture of OECD’s regulatory 
framework on business and human rights. The aim is to understand and evaluate the 
effects OECD’s work has had in the corporate Human Rights issues and whether the 
procedures put in place are adequate to guarantee that multinational enterprises in fact 
take into account the human rights of the people affected by their operations. The thesis 
will question the effectiveness of the regulatory framework and point out the areas that 
might need improving.  
                                                
18 International Labour Organization (ILO), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work, June 1988 
19 Also referred as multinational corporations and transnational corporations. 
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2   Human Rights and Multinational Enterprises  
2.1   Changing roles in international law 
 
As the power relations of international order have been shifting in the 20th century, new 
actors have emerged due to multipolar post cold war status quo, and modern globalisation, 
the question of the role of non-governmental entities in international law has risen to a 
new level of significance. Some of the power and the responsibilities of the sovereign 
States has even been handed over to non-state actors due to privatization20 These tasks 
formerly occupied by States are now run by enterprises and international organisations.  
In Reparations for injuries the International Court of Justice (the ICJ) has recognized the 
UN’s ability to bring claims into the ICJ and therefore it’s limited personality in 
international law.21 As the UN is not a state, but has now been recognised by the ICJ to 
have these state-like qualities, it should theoretically be possible to admit that also other 
entities, such as enterprises could have restricted international legal personality under 
certain conditions. The international legal personality of enterprises is still under 
academic debate and this thesis will not be able to give a clear-cut answer on whether 
multinational enterprises are a subject of international law or not, but in the human rights 
scholarly it has been stated that enterprises are not completely excluded from having 
human rights responsibilities.22    
Even though the subjectivity of enterprises, multinational or not, in international law 
might be a question without an absolute answer, another question is yielded from the 
current state of affairs: Can multinational enterprises, formally subjects of international 
law or not, have international human rights responsibilities?  
                                                
20 Andrew Clapham, ‘Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press 2006) 8   
21 Reparations for injuries, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep 174. In the case concerning the reparation 
for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations the ICJ considered that the United Nations is an 
entity possessing objective international personality, not only recognized by the Member States to the UN 
but also non-members.   
22 See for example Andrew Clapham (n 20) and Philip Alston  Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2005) 
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Most of the Human Rights Conventions, if not all, recognize that individuals have at least 
one responsibility towards other individuals in Human Rights law: the responsibility to 
respect the human rights of other individuals.23 Even though the primary responsibility 
for protecting human rights belongs to States, the ever-globalized markets and powerful 
multinational enterprises have created a need for a more thorough international 
framework related to the issue of accountability and responsibility of Non-State Actors 
in ensuring that every individual can fully enjoy their respective human rights.  
The question of Human Rights responsibilities of Multinational Enterprises has become 
even more urgent, as multinational enterprises operate in States other than the ones they 
were founded in, often in weak governance-zones. According to the OECD “Weak 
governance zones” are defined as investment environments in which governments cannot 
or will not assume their roles in protecting rights (including property rights), providing 
basic public services (e.g. social programmes, infrastructure development, law 
enforcement and prudential surveillance) and ensuring that public sector management is 
efficient and effective. These government failures lead to broader failures in political, 
economic and civic institutions that are referred to as weak governance.”24  This 
governmental failure allows multinational enterprises to take advantage of such 
conditions.  
Despite the fact that it is primarily the government’s task to establish a functional legal 
order, the situation where a private entity could conduct in acts that are against the 
international law in insufferable. The race to the bottom causes often numerous violations 
of human rights in the host state. These questionable operations can include “sweat shop 
conditions, indigenous peoples’ communities displaced without adequate consultations 
or compensation to make way for oil and gas company installations; foods and beverages 
firms found with seven-year-old children toiling on their plantations; security forces 
guarding mining-company operations accused of shooting and sometimes raping or 
killing trespassers and demonstrators; and internet service providers as well as 
                                                
23 See for example UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 
1948, 217 A (III) preamble: “…. every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms 
and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition 
and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories 
under their jurisdiction” 
24 OECD, OECD Risk Awareness Tool for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones (OECD 
Publishing 2006) 11 
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information technology companies turning over user information to government agencies 
tracking political dissidents in order to imprison them.”25   
As the host government declines or is unable to address these types of issues it could be 
seen just that an entity of international status could challenge the status quo in the case in 
question. If this would be the case, then a corporation could be accounted for breaches of 
international human rights. The other potential mechanism could be that States of origin 
would exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction against corporations that conduct in wrongful 
acts in other countries.  
This chapter will discuss the international legal subjectivity of States and generally of 
Non-State Actors, then setting the focus on Multinational Enterprises. Secondly this 
chapter will discuss the obligations of Multinational Enterprises generally in International 
Human Rights Law and whether or not Multinational Enterprises can be held 
internationally accountable for infringes of Human Rights of others. Last I will present 
concluding remarks.  
 
2.2   States as the primary subjects of international law  
Public international law, the law of nations, has its traditionally meaning as being the 
rules regulating the relations between States.26 A subject of International law is “an entity 
of a type recognized by customary law as capable of possessing rights and duties and of 
bringing and of being subjected to international claims.”27 Apart from the International 
Court of Justice’s decision Reparation for injuries where the Court recognised the UN as 
being capable of bringing claims in the International Court of Justice, the sovereign States 
are the main actors in public international law.  Inside the terminology of a state there are 
different complexities on what counts as a state. The legal criteria of statehood is listed 
in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States: “The State as 
a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent 
population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations 
                                                
25 John Ruggie, ‘Just Business – multinational corporations and human rights’ (New York and London 
W.W Norton & Company 2013) xv   
26 James Crawford (n 9)  4  
27 ibid 115 
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with other States.”28 However, this thesis will discuss only the question of States in 
general compared to multinational enterprises. 
Also in Human Rights law, the States are the main duty-bearers, as the human rights law 
itself has “traditionally been conceived as a set of norms and practices to protect 
individuals from threats by the state, attributing to the state the duty to secure the 
conditions necessary for people to live a life of dignity.”29 Therefore, the Human Rights 
law, as apart from general public international law, which regulates relations between 
States, is law between a state and a private individual or a private entity, as also 
enterprises can be right-holders in international human rights law. Even though Human 
Rights law protects individuals against actions of a state, it is also a State’s responsibility 
to protect an individual’s human rights from other individual’s actions with appropriate 
legislation. For example, according to Article 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights the parties to the treaty (States) shall “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.”30  
As stated in the first article of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
responsibility of a State to protect the individual from Human Rights violations concerns 
the individuals within the State’s jurisdiction. Under international law the state has 
jurisdiction over the population within its territory. International law also imposes a duty 
to the State to protect individuals within its jurisdiction from abuses of their human rights 
by non-state actors through legislation and policy-making.31 However, the State is not 
responsible for protecting individuals that are not within its territory. Hence, if a Non-
State Actor violates an individual’s human rights, the only state responsible of protection 
is the State within which the violation occurs. This, however, has caused some debate by 
scholars stating, that if a State would have extraterritorial jurisdiction it could protect 
people that cannot be protected by their own government.32  
                                                
28 Convention on Rights and Duties of States adopted by the Seventh International Conference of American 
States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 
29 John Ruggie (n 25) 25  
30 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5 
31 John Ruggie (n 25) 39  
32 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons, 'Responsibility beyond Borders: State Responsibility for 
Extraterritorial Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law' (2007) 70 Mod L Rev,598, 
598  
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2.2.1   Extraterritoriality of State duties  
It is possible under customary international law and under human rights law that a state 
is responsible for an act committed by someone else when the wrongful act can be 
attributed to the state.33 According to the International Law Commission (ILC) a conduct 
of any state organ is considered as an act of a state whether the organ exercises legislative, 
executive, judicial or any other functions.34 It also States that a private individual’s act 
might be considered as an act of a state. This is the case when “the conduct of a person 
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the 
person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction 
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”35  Therefore, it is possible, that a 
corporation’s acts outside of the national territory are attributed to the state, when the 
corporation uses governmental authority or when it functions on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of the State. However, when the corporations operate abroad 
they usually set up a subsidiary in the host state. This subsidiary body of the corporation 
is the national of the state that it was established in and under that state’s jurisdiction. 36 
There are international policy-domains where a national jurisdiction has extended to cross 
borders so that the state can ensure that non-state actors within their jurisdiction do not 
abuse recognized rights, for example antiterrorism, money-laundering and environmental 
protection. The extension to extraterritorial jurisdiction is very limited on the Human 
Right issues. Even though Human Rights treaties do not require States to use 
extraterritorial jurisdiction they are not prohibited to do so if there is a “recognised 
jurisdictional basis” such as where the actor or the victim of abuse is a national of the 
state that uses extraterritorial jurisdiction. 37 
There is a major public interest in protecting every individual’s human rights also from 
non-state actors and an apparent gap of responsibility where human rights violations 
occur, especially in weak governance zones, and no state offers protection or remedy to 
the victims, not even the state under which jurisdiction the violations occur. This is 
                                                
33 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons (n 32) 601 
34 International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd session, A/56/10, August 2001, 
UN GAOR Article 4 
35 Ibid Article 8  
36 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons (n 32) 615 
37 John Ruggie (n 25) 39-44 
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especially due to the fact that multinational corporations tend to take their business into 
the countries of “weak governance zones” where manufacturing is more economical for 
the companies and where the rights of the individuals affected by the operations might 
not be the priority for the government. There is a need for resolving the issue, and it is 
possible that if the state duty to protect individuals from human rights violations would 
be extended to an extraterritorial responsibility to protect individuals.  
However, the extraterritoriality of state duties is not coherent with the doctrine of the 
equality of States and the principle of non-intervention. The legal personality and the 
legal subjectivity of a state is directly linked to the idea of States being sovereign and 
equal. This means that a state has exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and the 
permanent population living on its territory and the duty of non-intervention in the 
territory of jurisdiction other sovereign States.38 The principle has also been noted in 
Lotus, where the Court stated that “the first and foremost restriction imposed by 
international law upon a state is that – failing the exercise of a permissive rule to the 
contrary- it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state.”39 The 
States are all equal in judicial terms and a state should refrain from interfering with other 
state’s national affairs. It is therefore politically and diplomatically risky for a state to 
“meddle” into another state’s internal affairs. However, as Ruggie has noted, the whole 
system of international Human Rights Law is interfering with the classical view of non-
intervention.40  
In the context of Human Rights Law, it is reasonable to ask whether it should be possible 
for another state to intervene in other States area of jurisdiction when a breach of an 
international obligation is taking place in said area. In some cases the jurisdiction to bring 
a claim can be universal and overcome the principle of non-intervention, as it was in 
Barcelona Traction.41 In the case the ICJ held that “When a State admits into its territory 
foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether national or juristic persons, it is bound 
to extend to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the 
treatment afforded to them. These obligations, however, are neither absolute nor 
unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
                                                
38 James Crawford (n 9) 448 
39 (France v. Turkey) (1927) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10 
40 John Ruggie (n 1) 7 
41 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belgium v. Spain) ICJ Reports, 5 February 1970 
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obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising 
vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the 
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all 
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes.”42 The erga omnes norms that derive from “the outlawing of acts of aggression, 
and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the 
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.”43 As the 
paragraph 33 of the judgement notes, in contemporary international law there can be State 
obligations towards international community as a whole, which creates a legal interest for 
all States in the protection of these erga omnes norms, i.eg international human rights. 
Hence, as the ICJ has validated the concept of erga omnes norms, in principle it should 
be possible for all States to act against other States that infringe erga omnes obligations. 
Despite of this, the ICJ stand has not entered the world of “is” in international law due to 
continuing debate on the actual meaning of the ICJ clause. 44  
Even if States would have an extraterritorial responsibility over the human rights 
violations committed by their national corporations the issues still arise when the 
corporation acting against human rights treaties is a large multinational corporations with 
strong ties to numerous States. It is complex to establish the state that would have the 
jurisdiction over the case. Another problem is that probably not many States would 
volunteer for using their jurisdiction extraterritorially to handle human rights grievances 
due to the massive amount of resources this would consume and the complexity of 
diplomatic relations with other States.  Other practical reason for States not willing to 
adjudicate extraterritorially according to Ruggie is that “Home States of transnational 
firms may also be reluctant to regulate against overseas harm by these firms because the 
permissible scope of national regulation with extraterritorial effect remains poorly 
understood, or out of concern that those firms might lose investment opportunities or 
relocate their headquarters.”45 It is also to be noted, that the governments of developed 
                                                
42 ibid para 33  
43 ibid para 34 
44 CJ Tams, ‘Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law’ (Cambridge University Press 2005) 
4 
45 John Ruggie (n 1) 6 
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nations usually hold as one of their primary foreign policy missions to improve their 
national corporations’ possibilities to succeed in foreign markets.46   
One type of means to solve the questions of handling human rights grievances happening 
abroad is through binding international treaty or soft law mechanisms. To this day, 
however, a binding international legal instruments regulating business and human rights 
has not been established. For the time being, the best applicable tool to manage 
enterprises’ human rights grievances is the OECD guidelines, which will be discussed 
further in this thesis.   
2.3   Multinational Enterprises 
2.3.1   Introduction 
 
States have traditionally been counted as the sole duty-bearer for Human Rights. This 
assumption on the State responsibility has increasingly been questioned due to the fact 
that globalisation has made non-state actors such as international organisations and 
multinational enterprises as powerful or at least almost as powerful players in the 
international field as the States. Philip Alston has described the relationship between non-
state actors and human rights regime as a “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome. According to Alston, 
all the actors in the international human rights regime that are not States are called Non-
State Actors. This group of actors in the sphere of international law can consist of such 
international institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the 
actors that this thesis is especially interested in: transnational corporations.47 
Multinational Enterprises, which are the focus point of the thesis are a sub-category of 
Non-State actors. Due to this, I will not go further than mentioning some of the other 
Non-State actors.  
Those Non-State Actors who have an undeniable power in the global economy have a 
denied role in international human rights law. This terminology to separate actors that are 
a State or not a State, according to Alston, marginalizes the non-state actors from the 
sphere of the most significant human rights challenges facing the global governance right 
                                                
46 Robert McCorquodale and Penelope Simons (n 32) 598 
47 Alston, Philip, ‘The Not-a-Cat Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate 
Non-State Actors?’, in Philip Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2005) 3 
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now.48  It is apparent that the traditional divide into Non-State Actors and States where 
only the States are the real bearers of Human Rights obligations cannot sufficiently serve 
the Human Rights domain. There are examples on easily preventable Human Rights 
violations from the part of transnational corporations in host States, where a transnational 
corporation has been able to escape from consequences both on national and international 
level. One of these examples is the Rana Plaza collapse, where in 2013 a building meant 
for offices but used for garment factories collapsed killing approximately 1100 people in 
Bangladesh due to the poor labour conditions. According to news outlets, similar 
hazardous working conditions still put garment industry workers at risk.49  
What then can be done to a human rights violation conducted by a non-state actor? An 
enterprise is under an obligation to obey the national laws of the state under whose 
jurisdiction it operates. In principle, it would be this state’s responsibility to protect the 
persons under its jurisdiction. However, this kind of protection seems to be more of an 
exception to the rule than a rule itself. Human Rights violations conducted by private 
entities appear in large amounts in the territory of a developing country or in a conflict 
zone, with weak governance and non-existing judicial remedies for persons suffering 
from violations caused by non-state actors.  
2.3.2   The role of multinational enterprises in international law  
 
In texts concerning corporations and human rights obligations, a multitude of terms are 
used to describe the corporation. Despite this there does not seem to be an universally 
accepted legal definition for a multinational enterprise.50 According to the OECD 
Guidelines “multinational enterprises are companies or other entities established in more 
than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their operations in various ways. 
While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence over 
the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely 
from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership may be private, state or 
                                                
48 ibid 
49 Reuters, ‘Five years after Rana Plaza disaster, many workers face 'unacceptably dangerous' conditions’, 
24 April 2018 < https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-garments-accident/five-years-after-rana-
plaza-disaster-many-workers-face-unacceptably-dangerous-conditions-idUSKBN1HU301 > accessed 16 
September 2019 
 
50 John Ruggie, ‘Multinationals as global institution: Power, authority and relative autonomy’ (2018) 12 
Regulation & Governance 317, 318  
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mixed.”51 However, the Guidelines cover both enterprises operating abroad with 
international ties as well as purely national enterprises.  
According to the Guidelines, in international law, the legal subjectivity of a corporation 
is a more contentious question. Especially after the beginning of economic globalisation, 
the number of corporations operating in more than one country has increased in resources 
and in power in the global trade. However, corporations are not subjects of international 
law the way that sovereign States are.52 This means that if corporations are not subjects 
of international law they cannot be accountable for breaking international laws. Usually 
it is the nation States’ responsibility to ensure that their national legislation is not violating 
international laws. As explored earlier, this is not always the case. When the state under 
which jurisdiction the corporation operates cannot or will not make sure that its legislation 
or the enforcement of the legislation is in accordance with international standards, in 
principle corporations cannot be held internationally liable either. 
 The discussion of the international legal status of the corporations can be found unfruitful 
and without a satisfactory answer. According to Andrew Clapham, the discussion should 
be moved away from the issue of subjectivity and focus on the capacity of the 
corporations. Private corporations can be held accountable under international law for 
such acts as genocide, torture and crimes against humanity.53  According to the Rome 
Statute Article 25 the International Criminal Court (ICC) shall have jurisdiction over 
natural persons pursuant to the statute.54 The crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the 
ICC do not, however, cover most of the undesirable corporate conduct by the 
multinationals as the ICC is supposed to handle the most heinous crimes committed. 
International corporations can be bound under the international law also through treaties. 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention55 sets rules to nation States to punish corporations 
under their jurisdiction that violate the norms deriving from the Convention.   
                                                
51 OECD, The Guidelines (n 10), Concepts and Principles, 17 para 4 
52 James Crawford (n 9) 121 
53 Andrew Clapham (n 20) 29 
54 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, Treaty Series, 
vol. 2187, No. 38544 
55 OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Paris 21 November 1997  
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Clapham States that corporations have limited legal personality in international criminal 
law. Why could this not be the case with international human rights law?56 According to 
Clapham, the resistance to recognise corporations’ international legal personality “owes 
much to two fears. First is a fear that foreign corporations would somehow be able more 
easily to interfere in the political and economic affairs of States if they were 
acknowledged to possess a degree of international legal personality. Second is a fear that 
these foreign corporations would be able to trigger excessive diplomatic protection for 
national companies of the host state where the foreign nationals are controlling 
shareholders in those national companies.”57  
Corporations can increasingly affect the human rights situations in host States. The idea 
that corporations cannot have international legal personality rises from the substance of 
the public international law; it is the range of international norms that regulate the legal 
relations between States. However, since large corporations have more and more power 
and resources in the global trade, even more than some sovereign States, the traditional 
view has been questioned. Corporations as private entities have certain rights under 
international law, as do private individuals, for example corporations are right-bearers of 
human rights. Corporations can, under their operations outside of their registration States’ 
jurisdiction, severely affect the legal sphere of their host States. 
International Human Rights law recognizes the rights of individuals and corporations 
against a state. According to James Crawford, to classify individuals as subjects of 
International Law is unhelpful, even though they in some ways have capacities in 
international law. Crawford therefore disagrees with Clapham, that a legal subjectivity of 
a private person could be built on the terminology of capacity and the State has the 
“monopoly of responsibility” in Human Rights. This monopoly is based on the fact that 
even though Human Rights instruments might state that individuals possess rights and 
duties under International Human Rights Law, there is no possibility to enforce these 
duties.58 
However, for example in the case of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, it is binding on 
the adhering States but it in fact creates obligations for private entities. According to 
                                                
56 Andrew Clapham (n 20) 77-78  
57 ibid 78  
58 James Crawford (n 9) 121 
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Article 1 of the Convention “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer, 
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order 
that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties, 
in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business.”59 Hence, it is the State that has to produce legislation necessary 
to regulate its nationals to obey the Anti-Bribery Convention and the enterprise’s 
responsibility not to offer a bribe to a foreign officer. It would be therefore possible to 
produce similar enforceable legislation in the area of business and human rights. This 
does not mean that multinational enterprises would be counted fully as subjects of 
international law.   
2.3.3   Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights  
2.3.3.1   The Emerging corporate social responsibility 
International Human Rights law protects individuals of infringements of their human 
rights from States. The arguments on why human rights obligations could not be extended 
from States to Multinational Enterprises are numerous. The often quoted phrase resisting 
the corporate social responsibility including Human Rights comes from Milton Friedman, 
according to whom the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.60  
Peter Muchlinski has listed some of the most used arguments against the corporate 
responsibility on human rights.61 It is the state’s and state’s only responsibility to legislate 
on matters of importance and for individuals to obey that law. In fact, enterprises can only 
be beneficiaries of human rights, not their protectors. It is also unclear which human rights 
the companies would have the responsibility to protect as it can only affect the limited 
amount of rights that it’s workers have, such as wage.  
The most important argument against companies’ human rights responsibility in my view 
is that of the so-called “free rider problem.” The “free rider problem” means that not all 
of the states and enterprises are as interested in protecting human rights. The burden 
                                                
59 OECD, Anti-Bribery Convention (n 55) 7 Article 1 para 1 
60 Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ the New York Times 
Magazine 13 September 1970 
61 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights and multinationals: is there a problem?’ in David Kinley (ed), Human 
Rights and Corporations, Series: International Library of Essays on Rights (2009 Ashgate Publihing) 36 
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would therefore be unevenly distributed between entities, where some enterprises and 
some states would take on much more to improve the human rights than others. This 
would lead into a “competitive disadvantage in relation to unscrupulous corporations“ 
that do not take on similar responsibilities as others.62   
The free rider-argument can also be tied to the argument, according to which the corporate 
social responsibility would essentially mean that the human rights responsibilities would 
be “privatized” from States to multinational enterprises, “transferring to companies 
obligations that they believed belonged to States.”63 The human rights responsibilities 
must remain as the primary responsibility of a state and the companies operating in that 
state have to be put into a role where they impact positively on the human rights situation 
of the state through using the best company conducts available. The amount of 
responsibility the company has on the human rights situation in an oppressive state 
admittedly is difficult to measure, which puts in importance that each company operating 
abroad has put up a corporate code of conduct on the best company policies to positively 
influence human rights and follow-up on that policy. In my view the state’s human rights 
responsibilities do not contradict the enterprises responsibility to refrain from actions that 
can have negative effects on individual rights. 
Even though arguments against enterprise’s human rights responsibilities are logical, the 
calls for social responsibilities for enterprises are in fact due to the change in the economic 
world and are not unfounded. First, as Muchlinski states, the conception of a corporation 
has changed along with the corporation’s functions. Today, corporations are seen more 
as social organisations having social responsibilities towards their workers and others. 
Secondly Muchlinski notes that the call for corporate social responsibility is a wider 
political reaction to global economy and the “democracy deficit.”64  
Now there are moral expectations on corporation conduct from the public concerning 
human rights.  The social costs for a corporation failing to comply with international 
human rights standards might be significant.  A failure to respect human rights “can 
subject companies to the courts of public opinion - comprising employees, communities, 
consumers, civil society, as well as investors - and occasionally to charges in actual 
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courts.”65 Sustainable development and corporate social responsibility has grown to be a 
more significant part of today’s world agenda and these ideas have increasingly reached 
the consumers. To conduct in accordance with corporate social responsibility and 
respecting human rights and is in the best interest of the corporation. The good will and 
the reputation of the corporation has a significant value in the 21st century. However, this 
does not provide any repartition to the individuals whose rights were violated by the 
corporation. The social costs and the “right thing to do”-thinking are a good addition to 
sway corporations to act according to Human Rights law, but it is not enough. 
 Even though the importance of sustainable development and the corporation’s role in it 
has increased its public interest, the idea of human rights and corporations’ interests can 
still be seen as contradictory to one another. According to Dinah Shelton “the dominant 
view among economists and policy makers in multilateral financial institutions appears 
to be that any hindrances to global trade and investment are bad for the development in 
general.”66 Yet, the situation actually is the contrary because corporations can actually be 
very successful in the highly regulated environments such as Europe and North America67 
and the establishment of a rule of law is always good for both international trade and 
investment.68 According to Olivier De Schutter “although studies by the OECD have 
demonstrated that stronger labour standards improve efficiency and lead to faster 
economic growth, and have not damaged the export performances of the countries having 
adopted them,  it is considered nevertheless that the improvement of the core labour 
standards should result from a choice by the concerned State, rather than be imposed on 
it by threat of commercial sanctions.”69 
 It has even been argued, that he political and civil rights could be put on stall and when 
the economic development has stabilized the economy of the development state, the 
social justice would follow. However, the economic, civil and political rights enjoy an 
status of being universal, interdependent and indivisible. 70 The only possibility therefore 
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is to try to establish a stable economy without disregarding the socio-economic justice of 
the individuals in the developing economy.  
Nevertheless, there is a clear disadvantage in the relationship between large multinational 
enterprises and struggling developing countries benefitting the former. As the resources 
available for the enterprise can be larger than those of the state they operate in, it is 
possible for the multinational to dictate the rules of the business. According to Sarah 
Joseph “the economic muscle of MNEs may allow them to resist domestic sanctions” and 
even relocate to a more corporate-friendly environment.71 This, however, can have drastic 
consequences on the host states economy, which can lead to the host state not fulfilling 
its international responsibility to protect human rights.  
2.3.3.2   How do corporations violate Human Rights? 
When a corporation directly violates human rights responsibilities as an agent or under a 
direct control of a state, the state is responsible for the human rights infringement. 
According to International Law Commission the act of a non-state actor is attributable to 
the state if the private entity is “in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction 
or control of,that State in carrying out the conduct."72  Another question on corporate 
responsibility is that of the complex structural arrangements between corporate entities. 
The same way as States can operate through variety of different actions still being 
responsible for its agents, a company should be responsible for human rights 
infringements of its subsidiaries. The complex arrangements between companies has 
enabled corporations to hide behind their subsidiaries, for example a multinational 
enterprise can avoid any responsibility of its national sub-contractor. 
The most common types of direct human rights infringements by corporations have to do 
with labour rights, such as right to equal pay for equal work, freedom of association and 
right to non-discrimination. Other types of human rights breaches that the company 
involves itself in can be for example right to life, liberty and security of the person, right 
to an adequate standard of living and right to self-determination.73 However, enterprises 
can negatively impact on virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognised 
                                                
71 Sarah Joseph, ‘An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises’, in Menno 
T. Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (n 5) 78  
72 ILC (n 33) Article 8  
73 John Ruggie (n 1)  16  
 22 
human rights74 and therefore there is no need to specify the exact human rights that 
corporations should respect.  
The developing states are dependent on the investments multinational enterprises bring 
to them and are therefore complied to overlook corporate violations. This does not mean 
that the human rights would be protected in the host state hadn’t it been for the enterprise. 
The States are perfectly capable to oppress their own. This however, can also be used as 
an advantage by enterprises. Companies can infringe human rights indirectly through 
state actions. This merely means that the company knowingly benefits from the state’s 
human rights violations, for example benefitting from the state’s use of forced and child 
labour.75  
Corporations can also infringe human rights in compliance with the home state’s 
government.76 This does not mean that the State wouldn’t have the primary responsibility 
for oppressing individuals’ rights under its jurisdiction. However, the company can play 
some role in the state’s infringements, when its revenues help support this oppression.77 
Directly supporting government violating human rights includes an intention to 
participate in such acts, meaning that the company is aware of its assistance on the state’s 
breach of international customary human rights principles. These actions can include for 
example assistance of forced relocation of people from the area of company’s operation. 
The awareness of the compliance does not mean that the company has to wish for the 
state’s actions to violate human rights.78  
All of the possible ways that companies can take part in negatively impact the lives of 
individuals of the state that they operate in can be reduced by the company’s prevention 
on how to not negatively affect human rights. A company can best obey the requirement 
to respect human rights by conducting due diligence assessment on its actions. According 
to Ruggie this means “steps a company must take to become aware of, prevent and 
address adverse human rights impacts.”79 This requirement of due diligence assessment 
can be included in national legislations. However, international framework for due 
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diligence assessment could fill a responsibility gap for when this requirement is not 
enforced by the state where the corporation operates. 
2.4   Concluding remarks 
International law is law regulating relations between States. Because of globalisation the 
lines between power users have been blurred as private entities such as international 
organisations and multinational corporations have emerged and become more influential 
in world politics. International organisations such as the UN has been granted limited 
international subjectivity, but the debate of the status of corporations is still on-going. 
States are resisting the possibility of granting corporations a status of an international 
legal subject because of the fear that corporations could overpower them in international 
politics and take part in creating international customary law.  
The discussion on the corporations’ international legal subjectivity is proving to go round 
in circles and produce unsatisfactory answers. Therefore suggestions on expanding 
national state’s jurisdiction beyond the borders of the state has been raised. However, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction would be complex in practice and due to complex diplomatic 
relations seems like an impossible task to accomplish. 
However, it is apparent that something needs to be done for the responsibility gap 
between, where multinational enterprises can operate in States of weak governance zone 
and possibly infringe human rights without being held responsible by either the host state 
or the home state.  The corporate social responsibility thinking has emerged in Business 
and Human Rights due to the significant influence corporations can have on socio-
economic rights. There are now moral expectations on enterprises put on them by the 
public. Multinational enterprises are seen as social actors that can affect individual rights 
of the people affected by their operations and the social costs on an enterprise that does 
not act responsibly when doing business can be significant. The rights that these 
operations affect can touch virtually every recognised human rights. Even though it is the 
state’s primary responsibility to guarantee protection for persons the activity of 
enterprises in  this are to advance social justice is needed.   
Corporations themselves can have a positive impact on the human rights of their host 
countries by conducting appropriate due diligence and corporate codes of conduct on the 
best corporate conducts, as long as they choose to follow them. However, the mere 
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voluntarism of the corporations is not enough. It can lead to imbalances on the 
responsibilities between corporations, causing a “free rider problem” as noted earlier 
which only leads to some enterprises acting appropriately.  
The next chapter will look into a one solution of the governance gap in human rights and 
multinational enterprises, which consists of the OECD conducting global governance to 
regulate human rights effects of multinational enterprises through soft law initiative of 
the OECD Guidelines. 
  
 25 
3   OECD and Global Governance 
3.1   Introduction 
Non-binding obligations and soft law have always been a part of the international legal 
system.80 Customary law is one of the main sources of international law and the state 
practice, not accorded in conventions or treaties, constitutes the process of the formation 
of customary international law. 81 Corporate human rights violations cannot be processed 
under customary international law because they lack the international consensus 
necessary to become international customary law.82 Hence, human rights violations and 
corporate social responsibility in general is increasingly regulated through soft law. One 
of the main actors in this field is the OECD together with ILO (International Labour 
Organisation) and its Tripartite Declaration83 and the United Nations with its 
“Protect,Respect, Remedy”-framework and the UN Guiding Principles.84 This chapter of 
the thesis will explain how the OECD is capable of influencing national policy-making 
through soft law. OECD’s work forms a part of Global Governance, which is a form of 
governance described as “an instance of governance in an absence of government.”85  
As the OECD is an international organisation that rarely establishes binding rules onto its 
member States, it is fair to ask how the Organisation can produce norms that affect 
national policies in various fields and why are the member States inclined to implement 
these norms. There is a variety of theories to explain the authority of international 
organisations. This chapter of the thesis will discuss the theories which are most suited to 
describe the OECD’s influence in the global policy-making; especially as an actor using 
ideals and premises as well as peer pressure to sway national policy-makers to agree with 
its initiatives.  
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The ways that an international organisation such as the OECD can persuade its member 
and Non-Member States to comply and commit to its policy initiatives in various fields 
can be described being complex by their nature. OECD’s governance forms a necessary 
part of non-binding regulatory framework meant to answer relevant global questions such 
as global warming, environmental issues and issues on human rights. The reason for 
increased use and need of soft-law as a regulatory mechanism has to do with the 
“broadening subject matter of international law, the claims by and against non-state 
actors, and the global challenges posed by, inter alia, environmental degradation, 
decreasing natural resources, sustainable development, human rights violations, and 
disarmament.”86  
One of the reasons behind the normative power of the OECD is its capability to adjust in 
the changing global environment. In the end of the 20th century, Global Governance has 
faced new phenomena such as expansion of the foreign direct investment and integration 
of financial markets.  Due to the economic globalisation, it has become apparent that the 
traditional international public law can no longer satisfy the needs of the international 
community and therefore needs actors such as the OECD.  
3.2   OECD as an International organisation 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has its roots in the times 
following the Second World War. Originally called as the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation, the OEEC was established in 1948 due to the US demand to 
"some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation 
and the part those countries themselves will take".87 The OEEC was created to operate 
the US Marshall Plan in war-torn Europe designed to rehabilitate European countries, 
improve exports from the US to Europe and to stop communism from spreading to fragile 
countries.88 Besides reviving the European economies, OEEC had its aims in “the 
development of a European customs union, and, ultimately, a free trade area.”89  OEEC 
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was especially mandated to oversee the distribution of the Marshall Aid.90  The OEEC 
had a major role in reviving European countries to market the economies they are today.  
As the European Economic Community was created in the late 1950s the OEEC lost its 
meaning.91 
In 1960 the Organisation Economic Co-operation and Development, the OECD was 
established, now broadening its scope from some European States to the US and Canada 
as well. The OECD was brought into life with the OECD Convention on the 14 December 
196092 and the convention came into force on 30 September 1961. Today, there are 34 
Member States to OECD, mainly western developed nations.   
According to Article 1 of the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (hereinafter the Paris Convention) the aim of the OECD “shall be to 
promote policies designed: 
a)   to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising 
standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and 
thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; 
b)    to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member 
countries in the process of economic development; and 
c)   to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory 
basis in accordance with international obligations.”93 
The OECD was created to promote and further policies to achieve the highest possible 
economic development in the world. This means that its mandate can basically cover any 
policy-area that can have an impact on a member state’s economic growth. Therefore, it 
is possible for the OECD to have a global influence on for example tax policies, trade, 
work and education.94 This is one of the OECD’s strengths as an international 
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organisation as its work is not limited to one specific area, which means that it can 
influence global economy on a larger scale.  
Another strength the OECD has as an international organisation is its ability to commit 
Non-Member States in its policies. Non-members are excluded from the OECD Council, 
which is the deciding body of the Organisation.95 However, non-members are allowed to 
participate in the work of the subsidiary bodies of the OECD, which are listed in the Rule 
1 b of the Rules of Procedure of the Organisation.96 According to the Rules of Procedure 
“the Council may invite a non-Member to be represented by an Invitee or a Participant, 
or an international organisation by an observer, at meetings, or parts of meetings, of all 
or certain bodies of the Organisation”.97  
According to the OECD Convention Article 12 “Upon such terms and conditions as the 
Council may determine, the Organisation may:  
a)   address communications to Non-Member States or Organisations;  
b)   establish and maintain relations with Non-Member States or Organisations; 
and  
c)   invite non-member Governments or Organisations to participate in activities      
of the Organisation”.98  
The majority of the work of the Organisation occurs in the committees as it is the 
committees that conclude the policy advises and the “soft law” that is later ratified by the 
Council.99 Even though the Non-Members can mostly participate as observers, it is a way 
for the OECD to communicate and have a discussion also with other parties than the 
members only.100 Non-Members can also adhere to OECD soft law mechanisms, the most 
important of them to this particular thesis being the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises.101 When adhering to the Guidelines the Non-Member States embrace the 
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policy recommendations included in the guidelines. Moreover the Non-Member States 
adhering to them are obliged to set up a monitoring body, National Contact Point, within 
their administration.102 The Guidelines and the National Contact Points will be discussed 
in more detail later in the text.  
In accordance with the principle of speciality, international organisations cannot produce 
other legal obligations than those that the member States have conferred to them by the 
treaty establishing the Organisation.103 The OECD is mandated in order to achieve its 
aims, according to Article 5 of the Paris Convention to:  
a)   take decisions which, except as otherwise provided, shall be binding on all the 
Members; 
b)    make recommendations to Members; and 
c)   enter into agreements with Members, Non-Member States and international 
organisations.”104 
The decisions taken by the OECD are “legally binding obligations for all of the Member 
Countries who do not abstain when the Act is adopted and…. while they are not 
international treaties they do entail, for Member Countries, the same kind of legal 
obligations as those subscribed to under international treaties”105.  The recommendations, 
on the other hand, are non-binding for the Member States. However “practice accords 
them great moral force as representing the political will of Member countries and there is 
an expectation that Member countries will do their utmost to fully implement a 
Recommendation”106.  
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Despite of the principle of speciality, the OECD has created a large amount of other types 
of procedures that have the potential to create obligations to its member States.107 The 
legal instruments can be for example good practices, guidelines and declarations. OECD 
declarations are to set out “relatively precise policy commitments subscribed to by the 
governments of Member countries. They are not formal Acts of the Organisation and are 
not intended to be legally binding, but they are noted by the OECD Council and their 
application is generally monitored by the responsible OECD body”.108 These procedures 
include for example best practices, guidelines, official interpretations and manuals, some 
of which are not actually intended to guide the actions of States but that of economic 
actors.109 The fact that these policy commitments are not with any legally binding force 
does not mean that they could not bear a certain amount of legal influence in the sphere 
of international law. According to Hervé Ascencio these norms are created to be “pre-
normative”, acts that are preparations of actual legal obligations or a part of a complex 
legal instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines are an addition to the OECD 
Declaration.110 The manuals, guidelines, best practices and other non-formal procedures 
created by the OECD are also sometimes included in the annexes of the formal legal 
documents of the OECD Council. This creates both, the link between the methods and 
the aims of the OECD documents as well as the link between the OECD standards and 
international law.111 
Article 6 of the OECD Convention requires consensus for adoption of Recommendations 
and Decisions, though members may abstain and thereby enter the equivalent of a 
reservation. Even though the OECD Decisions are binding, they do not usually provide 
sanctions for noncompliance.112 As mentioned earlier, International law cannot bind 
individuals. However, as the Member States are under the “moral obligation” to 
implement the soft law deriving from the OECD this does affect the actions of individuals, 
even if not legally obligating, but through the policies nation States put in place to protect 
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the common policy aspirations they share with the other member States of the OECD and 
the Organisation itself.  
Even though the OECD is mandated to provide legally binding decisions on Member 
States, as an Organisation, OECD mostly works through consultations and expert 
knowledge. The majority of its work is conducted through non-binding and non-
enforceable tools, utilising member state officials’ as well as the OECD staff members’ 
expertise. The committees, the OECD secretariat, composed of OECD officials, and 
national officials work together in OECD bodies binding “the brightest folk working in a 
given policy area”.113 The national officials bring the ideas back to their home States for 
the national policy makers. A well as the level of expertise that the OECD work is 
conducted with it is the mutual commitment of the member state officials to the shared 
aspirations that create a degree of legitimacy on OECD policy-making.    
The globalisation has changed the world order by causing major economic developments 
such as expansion of world trade and integration of financial markets.114 As the borders 
between States become blurrier, the need for cooperation in the field of economy and 
social issues grows exponentially. This gap exists due to the lack of common international 
regulation has been filled with global governance, which is now highly occupied by 
international organisations. In the field of global governance, the OECD has been noted 
as an “overlooked Organisation”, which as a matter of fact “exercises enormous amount 
of influence simply through its Organisational activities” and not given much attention in 
scholarly.115 
In part due to the type of member States OECD holds and in part due to the way the 
OECD conducts its work, it has been characterized as a “think tank” and a “rich man’s 
club.”116  Conversely, it has also been quoted as “an example of a de jure powerless 
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international organisation, but one which has gained regulatory influence.”117 In fact, the 
OECD has been quite successful in shaping the national policies in its member States. 
The Organisation works efficiently through persuading its Member States and the Non-
Member States to follow their shared aspirations in world politics than through legal 
regulation.118 The authoritative power of the OECD will be discussed in the next chapter 
more thoroughly.  
 
3.3   The authoritative power of the OECD  
 
3.3.1   Governance through identity  
 
“Although it is feasible to think that actors’ ability to influence others’ behaviour is based 
on structural sources of power such as money or military force, from the actors’ 
perspective it all boils down to their conceptions about the facts and about themselves as 
actors: what they are able or forced to do, and what their desires and obligations are. 
Therefore it is apparent that – whether they are conscious of it or not – actors who aim to 
be influential in politics attempt to affect others’ views of reality.”119 
 
Richard Woodward has divided the forms of governance OECD uses into four parts, the 
most important of them being the cognitive framework and the normative framework.120 
An example of a cognitive governance Woodward uses rises from the post Second World 
War era. The OECD has the capacity to produce a sense of identity and community 
amongst the member States.121 The member States of the OECD want to establish 
themselves as being “a member of a community of nations committed to democratic as 
well as market-oriented institutions”.122 This approach of playing with the cognitive idea 
of the States on themselves has its roots in the European history. For example, Finland, 
right in-between the liberal west and communist Soviet Union, when joining the OECD 
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in 1969 made a clear choice to be a western, liberal and democratic state.123 The 
capitalistic and developed economies that the OECD member States gradually turned into 
became the “prototype for the best kinds of States” when compared to suffering planned 
economies of communistic States. 124 This is a prime example of shaping the identity and 
belonging to a community the OECD builds when creating its policies.  
Pertti Alasuutari and Ali Qadir have suggested an epistemic governance point of view on 
the policies of policy-making. They have suggested that policy-making is depending on 
the actors’ “understanding of the world and the situation at hand.”125 The power an 
international organisation uses to persuade the governed on the policy initiatives is by 
playing on the epistemic premises of the governed, whether or not the policy-maker itself 
is conscious of the efforts it does in persuading through appealing to the identification of 
other actors. To be able to persuade others, the politician must be able to show how the 
suggested policy is admirable by playing with the other side’s expectations and premises. 
As Alasuutari and Qadir puts it, the politician would have to “appeal to reliable sources 
of evidence, experts’ or other authorities’ views, to what she assumes are widely 
acknowledged values and principles, and based on all that she would argue that passing 
the law will be in the best interest of the nation”.126 
Despite the importance of the ontological claim on what would be the best policy on the 
issue at hand, According to Alasuutari and Qadir, the policy-making is not only about the 
ontology but also on appealing to common values and addressing the audience as a 
community with shared interests. Epistemic work conducted by politicians include three 
key proponents: ontology of the environment, actors and identifications, and norms and 
ideals.127 The policy-maker has to ”affect the shared view of what is a truthful and 
accurate picture of the situation at hand, work upon people’s understandings of 
themselves and others as actors (who they are, what community they belong to, and what 
other actors there are in the social world) and convince the actors about the right thing to 
do.”128 The epistemic governance leans more on to the deep-seated values of the actors, 
which is more or less unself-conscious and leans on opinions and sentiments of the 
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public.129 It can be shown, for example in the OECD’s role in the post second world war 
Europe, that the OECDs operations fit the theory of the epistemic governance as it has 
throughout its existence convinced states on its policy-aspirations based on their common 
shared values such as democracy and liberalism.  
To go further than the unconscious appeal to the shared deep-seated values of the States 
involved, Tony Porter and Michael Webb have suggested a constructivist view on the 
OECD policy-making. According to Porter and Webb the OECD Global Governance 
”involves the ongoing development of a sense of identity for members as it develops 
policy prescriptions appropriate for liberal-democratic countries that see themselves as 
world leaders, and the aspirations of member States (and some Non-Member States) to 
that identity gives the OECD considerable influence despite its lack of formal powers.”130 
According to Porter and Webb the OECD defines the identity of member States and 
through this identity-shaping it also defines their perceptions of what is in their best 
interest.131  
The OECD is capable of producing social facts and effect the identity of the actors; 
“Ultimately, what the OECD identifies as good policy or “best practice” becomes part of 
the identity of the ideal modern state — an identity to which western governments aspire, 
as do many non-western governments.”132 This development of identity of the member 
and non-members of the OECD is a continuum of the OECD’s role in the post Second 
World War era when the OECD was able to convince the countries of Europe on its policy 
initiatives by appealing to their desire to become a part of the industrial, liberal and 
developed west.   
The constructivist theory does not dismiss the epistemic idea of the knowledge-
production being the key to policy-making, and it in fact States that the identity-shaping 
is the most explicit in the peer review procedures, such as PISA.133 By using peer reviews 
and comparing States with each other the OECD can set an example of what is in the best 
interest of any country and which values and policies the member States should renown. 
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However, according to Porter and Webb “existing research indicates that something other 
than convincing scientific proof is involved in the influence of the knowledge produced 
by the OECD.”134 
Thus, it is apparent that a membership in the OECD cluster of States, is a label that States 
strive for. Identification to the norms and culture of the OECD has relevance for non-
members alike. OECDs operations fit both the epistemic governance theory and the 
constructivist theory. They both acknowledge the epistemic community theory, where the 
policy-making is based on the expertise and scientific analytical knowledge. However, 
there is more to the OECD governance. The states participating in OECD work have the 
same deep-seated values of economic liberalism, democracy and development. This 
stems from the history of the OECD as the “saviour” of the European countries and the 
idea of the best kind of state then implemented in the European countries’ identities. The 
shared values affect the policy-making today both “unconsciously” and in the on-going 
governance work that the OECD conducts that shape the identity of the states involved.    
3.3.2   Governance through knowledge-production 
The knowledge-production, also called the normative governance, of the OECD is the 
work conducted in the working bodies of the OECD where the policy-makers share ideas, 
discuss, review policies and learn from each other in the OECD working committees.135 
According to Article 3 of the OECD Convention the members are required to ”keep each 
other informed and furnish the Organisation with the information necessary for the 
accomplishment of its tasks; consult together on a continuing basis, carry out studies and 
participate in agreed projects; and co-operate closely and where appropriate take co-
ordinated action.” The work of the OECD is therefore built on cooperation between the 
OECD experts and the state officials.  
The role the OECD plays in international relations has often been explained through 
theory of epistemic communities, which stresses the importance of scientists and experts 
in global governance.136 “When the world becomes more globalized, decision-makers 
grow uncertain about what their interests are and how best to achieve them, and ideas 
become increasingly important as maps or frames for decision-makers in an unfamiliar 
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setting.”137 This is why the epistemic communities, “knowledge-based networks, most 
often focused on scientific, economic or technical matters” have increased in importance 
when persuading in policy-matters that are typical to the globalised world such as 
environmental protection.138 
An important part of an epistemic community is the action of learning from other actors. 
Members of the epistemic community participate in collective learning processes when 
acting as a part of an epistemic community, ending up in sharing common ideas, values 
and understanding.139 The reason that these policy ideas are then accepted as a part of 
national political environment is the authority of the members of the epistemic 
communities, in the case of the OECD the national officials and the OECD experts. As 
Woodward States ”the changed thinking seeps into wider policymaking circles when 
officials return to their homeland armed with ideas agreed with, or pilfered from,  their 
counterparts.”140 Hence, the knowledge-production OECD conducts is directly linked to 
the identity-shaping role of the Organisation as the discussions government officials have 
wich eachother and with the OECD staff can effectively change the way that the national 
policy-makers see the world around them.  
Conversely, some scholars argue, that the emphasis on the epistemic community is on the 
teaching, when learning on the other hand “is often conceptualised as the unidirectional 
diffusion of norms, rather than as an interactional, mutual process.” 141 According to 
Alasuutari and Qadir, the epistemic communities approach “tend to overlook how 
decision-makers are convinced in the first place that particular policies must be 
implemented, especially in a global context. The question of whether there is any 
analytical unity in the processes of such persuasion work has not been addressed.”142 
For an international organisation that has no formal jurisdiction over its member States 
and no possibilities to set sanctions on non-compliance, the authority of that Organisation 
rises from its legitimacy. This, stems from has Organisation’s reputation143 as the 
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authority of the Organisation is dependent on the judgements on the reputation on that 
Organisation.144 “The effect is reinforced by the diffuse sense that the OECD’s 
knowledge is an expression of the best States’ best practices.” 145 According to 
Woodward, “In a congested market place for information and ideas those stamped with 
the OECD imprimatur are seldom, or ever, accused of bias or political manipulation”.146 
Therefore also the normative governance in fact, also leans to the reputation that the 
OECD holds as an “impartial observer of global events”.147 
As the OECD does not use material sanctions. The OECD practices rely on the 
“authoritative and moral resources.”148   These resources derive from the peer pressure 
that the States face from both the OECD and other member States. The mostly used form 
of peer pressure by OECD comes from the peer reviews conducted on national policies. 
They can be defined as: “systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a 
State by other States, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed State improve its 
policy making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and 
principles.”149 The peer review processes cause peer pressure through “a mix of formal 
recommendations and informal dialogue by the peer countries; public scrutiny, 
comparisons, and, in some cases, even ranking among countries; and the impact of all the 
above on domestic public opinion, national administrations and policy makers.”150 Peer 
review can best be described as “soft persuasion” that drives the state to change its 
policies so that it can better reach the aspired goal, for example in the case of PISA, to 
establish the best possible educational system.   
It can be concluded that: The normative governance that the OECD exerts in the form of 
peer reviews and peer pressure combines both the cognitive side where the States are 
influenced through the image they are trying to achieve and the policies that are widely 
considered as best policies due to the un-biased expert knowledge production as well as 
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the power of the information turned into policies. The case in point that will be discussed 
next is the PISA peer review process, where both approached can clearly be traced.  
3.3.3   Authority of the OECD – an example: The PISA 
One of the most substantial evidence of the functioning of the OECD’s governance is the 
Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA, which is a peer review process, 
conducted every three years in member States and Non-Member States that want to take 
part in the review procedure. The PISA programme was established by a formally binding 
decision under Article 5 of the OECD Convention and the programme was first launched 
in 1997 as a part of OECD’s social efforts to improve labour markets.151 With PISA States 
can see how well their educational systems performed when compared to other States. 
PISA instigates the performance rates of educational systems as well as “foster lifelong 
learning.”152 PISA tests 15-year-old students in reading, mathematics and science. In 
2018, PISA was participated by 80 countries and economies.153 When compared to the 
amount of OECD member States, 34, the PISA has reached a large audience and 
established a significant role in educational policies in the world.  
The most important reason for establishing the PISA was the value of the actual 
information on the state of the national education for national policy-makers on knowing 
how to improve educational systems. The deeper reason for the OECD as to why conduct 
peer reviews on students stems from the idea that “an economy’s health can be determined 
by the capacity of its citizens to compete in a global environment”154 and for a state to 
establish a good educational system is necessary to the further economic, scientific and 
social development. 155 According to the OECD, the economies of the member States are 
dependent on highly educated workers and even though there is still work for individuals 
with lower qualities, their work prospects are “relatively challenging.”156 According to 
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the OECD research, “On average across OECD countries, the unemployment rate is 
almost twice as high for those who have not completed upper secondary education as for 
those with higher qualifications: 15%  of younger adults (age  25-34) without upper 
secondary education are unemployed, compared to around 7%  for those with a higher 
level of education.”157 It is therefore clear, that national educational systems and 
improving them are of a high interest for the OECD and the Member States. It is the high 
public interest on the national educational policies as a necessity for economic growth 
and development gives the justification for OECD to use its normative power on 
educational system, as it is mandated to establish any policies that further the economic 
development of its member States.   
By reviewing national policies OECD utilises its authority in the eyes of its member 
States and its so-called moral resources, for example the loss of reputation amongst peers 
when failing in reviews.158 Other than the loss of reputation peer reviews conducted by 
the OECD include “the power of surveillance and monitoring” that builds pressure on 
States to comply.159 From the cognitive approach, Porter and Webb state that by 
knowledge-production OECD is capable of transforming knowledge into social facts that 
exist beyond the conscious influence of the policy makers.160 When looking at the PISA 
program and the way it is now a real measurement of how well each state act in the 
educational field and actively aspire to reach the higher score in the PISA reviews by 
extensive reforms such in national policies, it is able to lean towards this way of thinking. 
PISA reviews are a perfect example of the authority of the OECD both from the point of 
view that the OECD is capable of shaping identities through transforming knowledge into 
social facts, which influence the way that the participants identify themselves as well as 
from the point of view where the States can learn from each other’s policies as well from 
the side where the peer reviews exert the power of peer pressure onto the member States 
not to fail.  
Armin von Bogdandy and Matthias Goldmann have researched the PISA reviews in the 
perspective of public international law and how OECD in fact uses public authority 
conducting peer reviews as opposed to the traditional view where the public authority can 
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only be displayed by the sovereign ruler of a nation state. At first, one could see the PISA 
purely as an act of consultancy and expertise, where OECD gathers data from the PISA 
adhering States and publishes the results of the data-collection. Von Bogdandy and 
Goldmann state that in conducting the reviews OECD uses its analytical knowledge in a 
form of public authority as the OECD is capable of using regulatory force over the 
adhering states through the reviews.161  
According to von Bogdandy and Goldmann even consensual-based international 
decision-making disturbs the national accountability mechanisms, as the monitoring of 
international decision-making for national operators such as NGO’s possibilities to 
monitor the conducts is limited. However, the economic and political risks for not 
participating in international co-operation can be a lesser evil for the States.162 This 
changes the idea of public authority consisting purely of legal orders accompanied by 
sanctions. According to their research this idea of public authority does no longer reflect 
the modern global state. It follows that according to their research “any activity with a 
certain impact on liberty should come under the definition of public authority, and not 
only legal commands.”163  
Von Bogdandy and Goldmann suggest that a legal framework should be built for PISA 
due to its influence on national policies, but has not yet been established as it is ignored 
by lawyers because of its lack of formal legal obligations.164 The traditional idea of 
forming other’s behaviour through mere legal powers has passed its expiration and act of 
an entity such as an international organisation should be regarded as public authority 
whenever this action is public and shapes the actions of others. As the PISA reviews have 
de facto caused States, e.g. Germany to conduct in massive reforms on its public 
educational system, the OECD has succeeded in using de facto public authority to shape 
its actions.165  
The character that the PISA lacks if considered a modern public authority is the 
accountability mechanism. In democracies, individuals are safeguarded from the use of 
public authority with administrative structures, such as fair procedures and a possibility 
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for judicial review. This so-called legitimacy function is necessary for national States but 
also for international organisations.166 The OECD is known for its closed-door meetings, 
and the Organisation lacks the administrative requirements for legitimacy. There is no 
transparency, responsiveness or public accountability in the way the OECD works.167 
Therefore as von Bogdandy and Goldmann have suggested there should be a legal 
framework guaranteeing that the public authority used in international  Organisations 
would still guarantee individual freedoms.168 
The PISA is a proof of global governance which is against the presumption, that “actors’ 
preferences are fixed and that their behaviour can therefore only be influenced by 
instruments backed by sanctions which change an actor’s expected outcome to an extent 
that makes him likely to comply.”169 The OECD has shown that by engaging States into 
a peer review process can affect their behaviour. This is done by producing analytical 
information and ranking States on their level of performance but also by affecting the 
States’ views of the importance of succeeding in these rankings as a part of their identity 
as successful modern States. 
 
3.4   Concluding remarks 
OECD is the embodiment of the new global governance which does not need treaties or 
conventions to produce some form of binding regulation. It has established itself from 
orchestrator of the Marshall Plan to a relevant international organisation with de facto 
power to persuade States to comply with its policy initiatives. It is capable to adjust to 
global changes through its soft law system where it is capable to produce new information 
and new guidance quickly due to their non-binding nature. It is exclusive and constantly 
tries to effect Non-Member States by including them in the OECD process.  
There are numerous theories of the way international organisations work. OECD can 
affect the premises of the States through national officials engaging in discussions with 
other national officials and OECD experts in working committees. This way it is possible 
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for the Organisation to create an atmosphere where the States can share values and ideas 
which affect their policy-making back home.  
OECD can influence national policy-making through identifications of actors as well as 
through knowledge production and peer pressure.  OECD can appeal to the deep-seated 
values and a sense of community of the members. By having the reputation of an unbiased 
expert knowledge producer it is able to sway its members that the OECD initiatives reflect 
the best possible practice a state can have. By conducting peer reviews on existing 
national policies OECD can put peer pressure onto its members to reform for example 
their national education system to become this example of the best possible state it can 
be.  
After shedding light to the methods on how the OECD uses its influence on States, it can 
be deducted that the most effective tool OECD has in its hands is the peer review process. 
The best example of the peer reviews’ success is the PISA, which by reviewing the 
national policies and ranking them has managed to cause peer pressure so high amongst 
the participating States that by conducting the peer review process, the Organisation uses 
public authority hence regulates the actions of the States participating in the PISA.   
It is also possible to view the OECD knowledge production from the angle of public 
international law. No longer it is not merely just the state which can use public authority 
over the governed. By influencing the acts of the member States the OECD uses public 
authority also in a juridical meaning over the States that follow its policies. By these 
actions OECD has shown, that it does not in fact need binding norms to establish a 
significant role in global governance. If the OECD would be considered as a public 
authority over its member States, further amendments related to accountability would 
have to be agreed in order to ensure so the rights of the governed.  
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4   OECD and the Regulatory framework on Human Rights 
4.1   OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
4.1.1   Background 
 
During the last decades, globalisation has changed the international politics. The number 
of private entities connecting beyond state borders and participating in world economics 
has raised. According to OECD Globalisation Indicators, this has generated “important 
welfare effects, including higher productivity and efficiency, increased average incomes 
and wages, greater competition, lower prices and increased product variety and quality. 
”170 At the same time, globalisation has increased injustice between developed western 
states and the developing countries. Multinational enterprises have the upper hand in so-
called “weak governance zones”, which are interdependent on foreign direct investment 
and the capital flow from abroad. As traditional international public law does not regard 
enterprises and individuals as subjects of international law there are numerous problems 
with international accountability.  
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (the Guidelines) were first 
established in 1976 as a part of the Ministerial Declaration on International Investment 
and Multinational Enterprises (The Declaration).171 The Declaration on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises was established in 1976 as a promotional tool 
for international investment. According to the Article 2 of The Declaration the  “adhering 
governments should, consistent with their needs to maintain public order, to protect their 
essential security interests and to fulfil commitments relating to international peace and 
security, accord to enterprises operating in their territories and owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by nationals of another adhering government treatment under their 
laws, regulations and administrative practices, consistent with international law and no 
less favourable than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises.”172  The 
Declaration, according to the OECD was a “policy commitment by adhering governments 
to provide an open and transparent environment for international investment and to 
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encourage the positive contribution multinational enterprises can make to economic and 
social progress.”173  
The Guidelines, as an addition to the Declaration, was a reaction to increasing unethical 
corporate conduct when operating out of their national states.174 Another reason for 
adopting the guidelines was the threat that the UN would establish obligatory regulation 
on the multinational enterprise’s and the non-binding OECD Guidelines were a way to 
slow down the procedure of creating normative regulation.175 The Guidelines are 
“recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or 
from adhering countries. They provide non-binding principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and 
internationally recognised standards.” 176 According to Ruggie and Nelson, “companies 
were merely advised to comply with national laws and encouraged to make a positive 
contribution to economic and social progress in their countries of operation.”177 The 1976 
version of the guidelines  seemed lacking the regulatory scope necessary as the guidelines 
were only applicable in host States that were also member States of OECD or adhering 
States to The Declaration, which usually were not the States where the most company 
inflicted human rights violations happen.   
Since the extensive reviews on the Guidelines there has been both praise and critique. 
The critique has mainly concentrated on the voluntary form of the guidelines and the 
weak authority especially in the work of the NCPs.178Yet, the NCP system has also 
received some cautious praise on the fact that the NCPs even though not being a formal 
dispute settlement mechanism, applies peer pressure on the implementing state leading to 
a “reasonable degree of compliance.”179  However, the most important improvements on 
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the guidelines were the extending the scope of the guidelines on the part of human rights 
and due diligence, which will be discussed next.  
4.1.2   OECD guidelines today 
Since the Guidelines were first adopted in 1976, they have been reviewed a few times, 
the latest update on the Guidelines taking place in 2011. The renewed guidelines included 
numerous improvements to their predecessor, including the adoption of the principle of 
“risk-based due diligence” which requires that the enterprises “Carry out risk-based due 
diligence, for example by incorporating it into their enterprise risk management systems, 
to identify, prevent and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts.”180  
On the human rights point of view, the biggest change to the Guidelines was the adoption 
of a human rights chapter, that follows the wording of the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework.181 Before 2011, the only human rights that were specifically mentioned in 
the Guidelines were the ones related to labour rights and a general principle on the 
responsibility of enterprises to “respect the human rights of those affected by their 
activities consistent with the host government's international obligations and 
commitments.”182 
Now the Guidelines cover numerous areas of corporate social responsibility: human 
rights, employment and industrial relations, environment, combating bribery, consumer 
interests, science and technology, competition and taxation. As stated in the general 
principles of the Guidelines, enterprises have acted in accordance with the principle of 
due diligence in all of the areas covered by the guidelines.183 The Guidelines also consist 
of commentaries on the chapters and procedural guidance for both the national contact 
points and the investment committee, to support the actors both implementing the 
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guidelines as well as enterprises to understand better how to comply with the requirements 
of corporate social responsibility.  
The reviewed Guidelines recognise that the States have the duty to protect human rights. 
However, the reviewed guidelines encourage enterprises to respect human rights and 
address adverse human rights with which they are involved with. The UN Guiding 
Principles were implemented in the chapter IV of the Guidelines. According to the 
renewed Guidelines, enterprises should avoid causing or contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts and seek ways to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts directly 
linked to their business operations. Enterprises should have a policy commitment to 
respect human rights, carry out human rights due diligence appropriate to their size, the 
nature and context of operations and the severity of the risks of adverse human rights 
impacts. The renewed human rights chapter also includes remedy for the victims of 
corporate conduct violating human rights. Enterprises should provide for or co-operate 
through legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts where 
they identify that they have caused or contributed to these impacts.184 The adopted human 
rights chapter is a welcome addition to the Guidelines as it recognises a certain positive 
obligation for enterprises when it comes to human rights issues.  
The reviewed Guidelines are addressed to all entities within a multinational enterprise 
(parent companies and/or local entities). According to the actual distribution of 
responsibilities among them, different entities are expected to co-operate and to assist one 
another to facilitate observance of the Guidelines.185 This amendment is especially 
beneficial for the NCP complaints mechanisms, as before the reform the NCP complaints 
tended to be inadmissible due to the lack of “investment nexus”, meaning that there was 
no link between the corporation, which was accused of human rights violations, and the 
entity that committed the violation. 186 The update of the Guidelines strengthened the role 
of the NCPs in other ways as well. It has been argued, that due to the implementation of 
the United Nations Guiding Principles and adoption of the requirement of risk-based due 
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diligence means that the NCPs “are de facto remedial institutions for the UN Framework 
and United Nations Guiding Principles”.187  
4.2   The National Contact Points 
4.2.1   Introduction 
The uniqueness of the Guidelines as a tool for regulating corporate social responsibility 
rises from the fact that amongst the other international regulatory frameworks (ILO 
Tripartite declaration and the UN Guiding principles) there is no similar system to assist 
on the implementation of the Guidelines. The Guidelines is the only regulatory 
framework with an institutional mechanism to promote the guiding principles established 
in the guidelines and to provide mediation and good offices to the victims of the violation 
and the corporations accused of them.188 National Contact Points are mandated to 
participate in “the resolution of issues that arise relating to the implementation of the 
Guidelines in specific instances.”189 Specific instance refers to a complaint placed by an 
individual or an NGO on a violation of the guidelines committed by a multinational 
enterprise head-quartered in an adhering state to the Guidelines.190  
Even though it is the NCPs that differentiates the Guidelines from other international legal 
instruments on corporate social responsibility, the system in itself is in parts somewhat 
problematic and has been under scrutiny from NGO’s such as the OECD Watch and The 
Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. These problems will be addressed in detail later.  
The Guidelines were established by an OECD recommendation. The voluntary 
characteristic of the Guidelines is compensated with the binding decision obligating all 
the adhering States to implement an NCP in their home States.191 The NCPs were included 
in the Guidelines in 1984. However, it was not until 2000 that the Decision of the Council 
on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises was adopted.  The review of 2000 
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introduced enhanced procedural guidelines, annual meetings, and transparency enhancing 
reporting requirements for the NCPs.192  
According to the Decision para 1.1 “Adhering countries shall set up National Contact 
Points to further the effectiveness of the Guidelines by undertaking promotional activities, 
handling enquiries and contributing to the resolution of issues that arise relating to the 
implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances, taking account of the attached 
procedural guidance. The business community, worker Organisations, other non-
governmental Organisations and other interested parties shall be informed of the 
availability of such facilities”.  Hence, it is obligatory to the adhering States to establish 
NCPs within their governments. Now all 48 adhering States have established NCPs. 193 
The NCPs are responsible for handling special instances with “visibility, accessibility, 
transparency and accountability to further the objective of functional equivalence”. As 
according to the Procedural Guidance “the NCP will contribute to the resolution of issues 
that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances in a manner 
that is impartial, predictable, equitable and compatible with the principles and standards 
of the Guidelines. The NCP will offer a forum for discussion and assist the business 
community, worker Organisations, other non-governmental Organisations, and other 
interested parties concerned to deal with the issues raised in an efficient and timely 
manner and in accordance with applicable law.”194  
Even though it is obligatory for adhering States to establish NCP’s it is still completely 
voluntary for a business enterprise to take part in NCP consultations. NCP’s cannot give 
enforceable judgements on the specific instances they handle. In fact the only negative 
impact that the enterprise might have on not recognizing the OECD Guidelines and not 
participating in NCP dispute resolution is that their non-compliance will be included in 
the public statement on the procedure.195 Yet, the role of enterprise’s loss of reputation 
should not be discarded, as the public is increasingly more educated on the issues of 
corporate social responsibility and boycotts on the company or their products can cause 
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a big loss of money flow to the enterprise. The NCP system can also fill a “transnational 
remedy gap” as Karin Buhmann calls it. She concludes that, because of the NCPs 
possibility to handle breaches of the Guidelines happening in a state that does not have 
its own NCP the OECD procedure for handling specific instances has a “rare 
extraterritorial reach that no national jurisdiction has.” 196  
4.2.2   Issues with the structure of the NCP system  
First, there is no international instrument that regulates the establishment of the NCP so 
it is the States that have the mandate to nationally set up NCPs within their respected 
governments. The Governments are free to act as they see as long as their conduct is in 
accordance with the Procedural Guidance attached to the Decision. According to the 
OECD Watch, “the institutional structure of these entities had displayed a considerable 
variety of different forms.”197 At first glance, this might not seem so problematic, but 
what the variety of institutional structure between the NCPs in different States can cause 
are big variations between NCP operations, which increases unpredictability and 
ineffectiveness of the NCP actions. Non-coherence of NCP conducts also results in 
unpredictability and ineffectiveness of the NCP system as a whole.  
Second, concerning the organising of the NCPs is the question of impartiality. According 
to the OECD Annual Report on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises of 
January 2018, 31 NCPs are based in Ministries of Economy, five in Investment Promotion 
Agencies and seven in Ministries of Foreign Affairs.198 The Ministries of Economy and 
Foreign Affairs also have on their agenda to improve their national companies’ status in 
the global markets.199 In January 2018, only four States had NCP’s that were not based 
in government administration.200 As the NCPs are organised by the governments and are 
based in government administration the question of conflict of interests and impartiality 
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rises. The conflict of interest may be a valid concern especially when companies are fully 
or partially state-owned.  
The Investment Committee is an organ which offers guidance for the NCPs. Its task is to 
consider requests from NCPs for assistance in carrying out their activities, including in 
the event of doubt about the interpretation of the Guidelines in particular 
circumstances.201 When handling specific instances “The Committee shall be responsible 
for clarification of the Guidelines. Parties involved in a specific instance that gave rise to 
a request for clarification will be given the opportunity to express their views either orally 
or in writing. The Committee shall not reach conclusions on the conduct of individual 
enterprises”. 202 The Committee does not conduct formal monitoring or follow-up on 
different state’s NCP procedures. The OECD recommends the NCPs to establish multi-
stakeholder advisory and oversighting bodies. Yet, in 2018, only six NCPs reported 
having a combined advisory and oversighting body. 203  
4.2.3   Specific instances in the NCP 
4.2.3.1   The procedure of handling specific instances  
The specific instance procedure was established to offer a forum for discussion and assist 
the business community, worker Organisations, other non-governmental Organisations, 
and other interested parties concerned to deal with the issues raised in an efficient and 
timely manner and in accordance with applicable law.204 After the 2011 review of the 
Guidelines, the amount of human rights complaints planted in the NCPs has risen 
exponentially.205  
When providing assistance in a specific case, according to the Procedural Guidance, “the 
NCP will make an initial assessment of whether the issues raised merit further 
examination and respond to the parties involved”. 206 This is the first obstacle that a 
complaint may face when planted in the NCP. The NCP can reject the case for example 
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because of technical issues such as a case not involving a company that is a national of 
an OECD or OECD-adhering country.207 After the 2011 review the admissibility of cases 
has increased compared to the time before the 2011 review when the inadmissibility rate 
of the complaints was a staggering 40 percent.208 The reason that the admissibility of the 
complaints has risen is due to the broader scope of the new guidelines, as they now 
concern enterprises throughout the whole supply chain. Before the reform, according to 
John Ruggie and Tamaryn Nelson, “the common bases for excluding cases was the lack 
of an "investment nexus," as the multinational involved did not hold equity in the 
enterprise in question.”209 However, the NCPs still receive criticism on their admissibility 
criteria and especially the non-coherency of it amongst NCPs. The OECD Watch has 
stated that some of the NCPs misinterpret the criteria of admissibility or over-analyse the 
facts in the initial assessment stage, which leads to dismissing cases that should not be 
dismissed.210 The criteria of admissibility is listed in the OECD Commentary on the 
Procedural Guidance. For the case to have merits for further examination the NCP will 
examine, whether the issue is bona fide and relevant to the implementation of the 
Guidelines.211  
OECD Watch’s report notes the case of FIDH et al vs. Italtel from 2018 that, according 
to the report, was “unduly rejected” by the Italian NCP in the initial assessment stage due 
to wrongful interpretation of the admissibility criteria.212 The issue concerned adverse 
impact of the actions of  Italtel on Human Rights in Iran. According to the complaint, 
Italtel did not act in accordance with the requirement of due diligence when forming a 
memorandum of understanding with an Iranian telecommunications company, and 
therefore enabled the Iranian Government and Islamic Revolutionary Guard to conduct 
internet censorship and surveillance. According the complainants, there was a risk that 
Italtel would participate in violating the Iranian people’s “right to freedom of information 
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and expression and the right to privacy of the Iranian people as guaranteed by the 
international human rights standards.”213 
The Italian NCP rejected the complaint as it was “not material or sufficiently substantiated 
to warrant further consideration”. The requirement of the issue being material or 
sufficiently substantiated comes from the OECD Commentary on the Procedural 
Guidance of the OECD Guidelines. The Italian NCP interpreted, that there was no link 
between the enterprises activities and human rights violence, because “no contract has 
been signed by Italtel after the memorandum of understanding; thus, at present, the 
contents and the details of the prospective contract are not finalized and they may change 
over the period. This inevitably implies that the current business relationship cannot be 
assessed as an actual or potential breach of the OECD Guidelines” and that the “the 
project involving Italtel has a limited scope within the context of the telecommunication 
system of Iran.”214 According to OECD Watch, the early rejection of an issue shuts down 
a valid arena for discussion between the complainant and the enterprise.215 
If the case is admissible, the NCP “offers its good offices to help the parties involved to 
resolve the issues. The NCP will consult with these parties and where relevant seek advice 
from relevant authorities, and/or representatives of the business community, worker 
Organisations, other nongovernmental Organisations, and relevant experts; consult the 
NCP in the other country or countries concerned; seek the guidance of the Committee if 
it has doubt about the interpretation of the Guidelines in particular circumstances; offer, 
and with the agreement of the parties involved, facilitate access to consensual and non-
adversarial means, such as conciliation or mediation, to assist the parties in dealing with 
the issues.”216 
Even though it is mandatory for governments to establish NCPs in their respected 
countries it is in no way obligatory for the Multinational Enterprise to take part in the 
procedure or accept the “good offices” and mediation provided by the NCP. In this phase 
of the NCP procedure, the NCP’s main task is to facilitate the discussion between the 
complainant, the enterprise and other parties that are involved. An NCP can request for 
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advice from other NCPs as well as from the Investment Committee and experts on the 
matter. 217 According to OECD, in 2018 only three out of eleven cases which went on to 
the mediation procedure reached an agreement.218 The statistics show there is a lot of 
room for improvement in the efficiency of the mediation procedure, as reaching an 
agreement in the mediation procedure is obviously the aim of the whole NCP system. The 
lack of success in mediation can also be traced to lack of resources and staff of the NCPs. 
219 
4.2.3.2   The conclusion of a specific instance  
The last phase of the NCP procedure is the conclusion of a specific instance. Once the 
case has been accepted for the procedure and negotiations of the parties involved are 
finished, NCP issues either reports or statements based on the procedure.220 When the 
parties “reach agreement as a result of the NCP’s intervention, the NCP should issue a 
report describing, at a minimum, the issues raised, the procedures initiated by the NCP in 
assisting the parties, and when the agreement was reached”. When there is no agreement 
reached the NCP “should issue a statement describing, at a minimum, the issues raised, 
the reasons why the NCP decided that the issues merit further consideration, and the 
procedures initiated by the NCP in assisting the parties.”221  These documents are to be 
made publicly available.  
In their public statements NCPs may issue recommendations, not defined in the 
Procedural Guidance, but which are according to the OECD, “suggested actions the 
parties are encouraged to take in order to resolve the issues; and in particular, suggested 
actions that the enterprise in question is encouraged to take in order to observe the 
Guidelines.”222Another tool, not included in the Procedural Guidance, is the possibility 
of the NCPs to produce determinations on the cases, which are “statements by NCPs 
setting out their views on whether the company observed the Guidelines.”223 
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According to the OECD’s report covering the period 2011-2018 the NCPs have issued 
much more recommendations on how to improve the conduct of an enterprise to meet the 
standards of the Guidelines than they have issued determinations on the non-observance 
of the Guidelines. Out of the 48 NCPs put in place 40 have drafted rules of procedures 
according to which they handle specific instances. According to the OECD, report 33 of 
these 40 NCPs (83%) has included giving recommendations on their rules of procedure. 
Only 9 (23%) of the NCPs have included issuing determinations in their rules of 
procedure. According to OECD 91 out of 211 closed cases since 2011 have included a 
recommendation as to only 37 out of 211 cases included a determination on the 
enterprises observance of the Guidelines.224 
One of the biggest concern raised on the NCPs work in specific instances are the refusal 
of some companies to cooperate in the process.225 Looking at the statistics provided it is 
clear that the determination is a less popular tool for the NCPs. According to the OECD 
Watch State of Remedy report, providing the victims of a breach of their rights under the 
Guidelines with a determination of a wrongful conduct by the enterprise would count as 
a “measure of remedy.”226 The threat of being publicly “named and shamed” would also 
play a crucial part in accomplishing real discussion and real actions from the side of the 
enterprise to take part in the NCP procedure and comply with the guidelines. Currently, 
according to the OECD Watch “governments should require NCPs to issue 
determinations of non-compliance or compliance with the Guidelines, as a measure to 
encourage companies to implement the Guidelines’ recommendations and participate 
meaningfully in the specific instance process.”227 Currently, when the majority of the 
NCPs do not provide their own determinations on the non-compliance of the Guidelines 
in the case of failing mediation the status of the victim stays the same as before the 
beginning of the NCP procedure. As the UN Guiding principles are founded on the notion 
of providing remedy, the Guidelines as an implementation tool for said principles should 
include actual mechanisms of remedy.   
According John Evans and Kristine Drew, the best performing NCPs play two roles: they 
offer good offices to resolve the specific instance at hand and when the enterprise is not 
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willing to cooperate it can provide a determination on the non-compliance of the 
Guidelines. A mediation process cannot function without a possibility of negative 
consequences. 228 According to OECD Watch, statistics out of all the cases filed by NGOs 
and communities from 2000 to 2017 there were 31 cases that resulted in an agreement 
between parties, 22 (73%) were facilitated by NCPs that make determinations on non-
compliance.229  
According to the OECD Commentary on the Procedural Guidance “If the NCP makes 
recommendations to the parties, it may be appropriate under specific circumstances for 
the NCP to follow-up with the parties on their response to these recommendations.”230  
The OECD’s Annual Report on the Guidelines 2018 concluded, “In 2018, the NCPs of 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom issued follow-up statements relating to 12 specific instances. In 
addition, plans for follow up or monitoring of recommendations was included in final 
statements for 10 out of 13 concluded specific instances (77%). The rate of references to 
follow-up in final statements doubled from that reported in 2017 (35%)”.231 This 
information is encouraging, yet, there is no information on the amount of follow-up 
procedures conducted by the NCPs so far, although it is encouraging that the NCPs seem 
to have higher interest in conducting monitoring on whether or not the enterprises actually 
improve their actions in accordance with the recommendations.  
The statements given by the NCPs in the conclusion of the specific instance can have 
somewhat a role of a precedent. According to Karin Buhmann, the NCP statements have 
relevance in the work of OECD committees and can become precedents through OECD 
decisions, the statements can offer guidance to enterprises, and NCPs faced with similar 
questions.232 Therefore, even though the determination on the observance or non-
observance of an enterprise adds a reputational risk to the enterprise’s conduct, the 
recommendations can also have a significant impact on the NCP practice.  
By moving towards all NCPs committing to use the tools such as determinations to 
provide remedy for the victims the specific instance procedure would increase its 
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effectiveness. In the OECD Annual Report 2018 two specific instances concluded, no 
mediation was established as the enterprises in question were not willing to participate in 
the NCP procedures.233 Even though the number seems small, it means that those NCPs 
lack in effectiveness. The two cases were from the NCPs of Brazil and Argentina, neither 
of which have a reference to issuing determinations in their rules of procedure. 234 
Even though the changes made in the Guidelines in 2011 has increased the possibilities 
for NCPs to handle specific instances and especially human rights complaints through to 
the adoption of the human rights chapter, the recent reports from the OECD and the 
OECD Watch have shown a decrease in the success rate of the NCP mediation 
procedures. According to the OECD Watch’s State of Remedy 2018 “just four (36%) of 
the cases that went to mediation last year reached some kind of agreement…. Only 11 out 
of the 34 National Contact Point (NCP) cases concluded in 2018 even made it to the stage 
of mediation in the first place, with the rest being rejected outright by NCPs.”235 
According to OECD’s annual report on the guidelines the 36 % of the cases mediated is 
a substantial decrease from the 2017 mediation percent of 83%.236 It is safe to say that 
due to the positive changes made to the Guidelines in the 2011 the NCPs could have great 
potential to help victims of infringements of their rights to receive remedy. However due 
to both insufficient Organisation that lacks coherency and can face risks of impartiality it 
also lacks effectiveness of the specific instance system as a whole.  
4.3   The impact of the Guidelines and the NCPs on Human Rights 
protection 
After the 2011 review of the Guidelines the amount of human rights complaints planted 
in the NCPs has risen. The Human Rights chapter was the third cited chapter in the 
complaints, only being led by the general principles chapter and the labour rights chapter, 
which means that the review of the guidelines in 2011 was an important change 
concerning the work of the NCPs. 237 Before the review the complaints concerning Human 
Rights were mostly concerning labour rights which also include certain human rights. 
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After the addition of the Human Rights chapter the subject area of the specific instances 
has not only increased in numbers but diversified as well.238  
According to most of the Human Rights instruments the victim of a Human Rights 
violation has a right to effective remedy.239 The UN Guiding Principles on Businesses 
and Human Rights that have been implemented in the OECD Guidelines chapter on 
Human Rights is founded on the notion of victim’s access to effective remedy.240 It is 
primarily the state’s responsibility to offer remedy to the victims. The States are 
sometimes not willing or capable of providing the remedy. Thus there is a responsibility 
gap that has been filled by international organizations. From these international 
organisations it is the OECD that has the best capacity to fill the remedy gap with the 
NCP mechanism.   
However, as provided in the earlier chapter, the NCPs lack effectiveness. The NCPs can 
issue recommendations to multinational enterprises on how to change their conduct so 
that it is aligned with the Guidelines’ standards. This can have a positive impact both on 
the enterprise that the complaint is about as well as set example to enterprises maybe 
facing the same issue. The cases handled in the NCPs can be also used in OECD working 
committees and other NCPs working on similar instances. As can be noted from the 
OECD statistics, the recommendations have increasingly been used in the NCP 
conclusions.  
Determinations issued by the NCPs can also form at least a partial remedy to the victims 
of Human Rights violations. According to the UN General Assembly, remedy in form of 
satisfaction can include “verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth 
to the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or threaten the safety and 
interests of the victim, the victim's relatives, witnesses, or persons who have intervened 
to assist the victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations”. Satisfaction can also 
include “an official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation 
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and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim”.241 
However, depending on the magnitude of the Human Rights violations whether or not the 
mere recognition of the situation counts as effective remedy is disputable.  
According to Karin Buhmann the due diligence standards are increasingly important to 
protection of Human Rights, as “even where remedy is available, its effectiveness to 
restore human rights harm is questionable.”242  Hence, even more crucial than providing 
effective remedy for the victims of human rights violations is to conduct due diligence to 
prevent the violations from happening in the first place. The adoption of the principle of 
due diligence covering all areas of the Guidelines in 2011 was extremely important 
especially in the question of human rights. However, due diligence is an extremely 
complex matter and the instance that could clarify the expected corporate conduct on due 
diligence are the NCPs through their final statements.243 
In May 2018 the OECD adopted the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for responsible 
business conduct to “provide practical support to enterprises on the implementation of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by providing plain language explanations 
of its due diligence recommendations and associated provision”. 244 As the guidance is 
quite recent its impact probably does not show in the statistics of the year 2018. However, 
if the enterprises begin to implement the guidance in their working plans it can have a 
positive change in the specific instance statistics. The best resolutions on the social 
impacts on company conducts can be reached, if the enterprises conduct thorough due 
diligence when doing business.  
4.4   How to improve the effectiveness of the OECD Guidelines? 
4.4.1   Peer reviews and awareness raising 
According to the Commentary on the Implementation Procedures of the OECD, 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises should engage in peer learning. The paragraph 
                                                
241 UN General Assembly, A/RES/60/147, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 
200, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
IX Reparation for harm suffered, 22. Satisfaction  
242 Karin Buhmann (n 187) 396 
243 ibid 409 
244 OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct (2018) 
<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-Due-Diligence-Guidance-for-Responsible-Business-Conduct.pdf> 
, accessed 18 August 2019 
 59 
19 of the commentary States that the NCPs are: “encouraged to engage in horizontal, 
thematic peer reviews and voluntary NCP peer evaluations. Such peer learning can be 
carried out through meetings at the OECD or through direct co-operation between 
NCPs.”245 
As can be noticed from the PISA reviews, the peer reviews conducted every three years 
on national educational systems have positive results on increasing reforms on national 
educational policies worldwide. However, the same enthusiasm on conducting peer 
reviews has not yet reached the NCP work. There could be several reasons for this. The 
public awareness of OECD regulation on multinational enterprises is very limited, and 
the knowledge of the existence of the NCPs even more so. The economic interest of a 
state to improve their educational system and therefore increase the populations capability 
in the labour market is probably well beyond its interest in ensuring that their national 
enterprises conduct their actions abroad in accordance with the voluntary guidelines on 
social responsibility. Mandatory demands on enterprises and the governments has also 
received extensive resistance from business.246  
Unlike with the PISA, peer reviews conducted on the NCPs are merely “highly 
encouraged” and therefore voluntary. There should be a precise peer review procedure 
for NCPs.  far only a few national NCPs have participated in voluntary peer review 
procedures. In 2018 a voluntary peer review was concluded by Austria, Canada, Chile 
Germany and the United States.247 The voluntary peer review system can also lack in 
efficiency, as it is not likely that the worst performing NCPs would be willing to 
participate in the peer review procedure.248 According to John Ruggie and Tamaryn 
Nelson “promoting awareness of the Guidelines is a legal obligation undertaken by 
governments. Therefore, minimum performance standards for NCPs and peer learning 
from the innovators among them should become a procedural requirement”.249 The core 
criteria for the functional equivalence of the NCPs are visibility, accessibility, 
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transparency and accountability. 250 This respective criterion could be better met with 
engaging sufficiently in promoting the Guidelines and conducting peer reviews.  
 Yet, according to the OECD “at the June 2017 OECD Ministerial Council Meeting 
(MCM), governments committed to having fully functioning and adequately resourced 
National Contact Points, and to undertake a peer learning, capacity building exercise or a 
peer review by 2021, with a view to having all countries peer reviewed by 2023”.251 This 
shows that there is willingness from the governments to improve the effectiveness of the 
Guidelines. If all the States adhered to the Guidelines will put in place policies to enhance 
corporate social responsibility even if only in the matter of succeeding in OECD peer 
reviews there is potential for both engagement of the enterprises because of tightened 
policy regulations from the government and the strengthening of the NCP system 
nationally.  
One of the tasks of the NCPs is to inform and promote the Guidelines in accordance with 
the Procedural Guidance, which States that the NCP will: “1) Make the Guidelines known 
and available by appropriate means, including through on-line information, and in 
national languages. Prospective investors (inward and outward) should be informed about 
the Guidelines, as appropriate. 2) Raise awareness of the Guidelines and their 
implementation procedures, including through co-operation, as appropriate, with the 
business community, worker Organisations, other non-governmental Organisations, and 
the interested public.”252 According to an OECD Report between the years 2000 and 2015 
there were 14 NCPs which have never received a complaint.253 This is more likely not 
because enterprises do not infringe the Guidelines and more likely due to the fact that the 
NCPs are “invisible or unresponsive to the possible complainants.”254  
The NCPs should engage more in the promotional work concerning the NCP procedures 
to guarantee that the complaint mechanism is accessible to possible complainants. At the 
same time the strengthening of the peer review procedure so that it is an actual 
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requirement for governments would enable NCPs to learn from one another on how to 
handle specific instances and how to conduct the promoting of the Guidelines and the 
NCP procedure.  Mandatory peer reviews would not only put a peer pressure on national 
NCPs to succeed above their peers but it would also increase the coherency of the NCPs 
work. The result of successful OECD soft law (and the aim of it) is to systemize national 
policies in specific policy-fields. The coherency in NCP work would also increase the 
legitimacy and the authority of the NCPs.255 
4.4.2   Effective cooperation and sanctions on non-compliance 
Another way to strengthen the effectiveness of the Guidelines and the authority of the 
NCPs is through state actions. According to Ruggie and Nelson “with one single 
exception, no government has publicly stated that non-cooperation by a company with an 
NCP or a negative finding against a company will have any material consequences 
imposed by a government”256 . This referring to Canadian government’s strategy to 
withdraw its support for foreign markets when a corporation fails to embody corporate 
social responsibility or does not participate in the specific instance-procedure. 257  
As the NCPs are usually located within government administrations, the NCPs would 
have the potential to use real leverage towards the enterprises that do not comply with the 
Guidelines. This could be for example “the staying of import or export licenses, the 
withholding of government subsidies and aid, or disqualifcation from government 
procurement”. If the NCPs were to use this kind of leverage the influence they would 
have on corporate conduct would be more broad than when only tackling single instances 
with mediation that has no enforcement methods and no monitoring after the 
mediation.258 
The State Action does not only have to be in the form of a sanction. States could cooperate 
with the enterprise to establish the best policies and practices. 259 As noted earlier the NCP 
recommendations can have a positive impact on the corporate conduct for both the 
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enterprise taking part in the NCP procedure as well as other enterprises. However, these 
recommendations should also include a follow-up mechanism to ensure that the enterprise 
follows the recommendations given. Despite this, when the enterprise fails to cooperate 
in the NCP procedure there has to be a real negative consequence, be it in the form of a 
determination on the non-compliance of the Guidelines which is made publicly available 
and the possibility of losing the financial support of the Government for a certain amount 
of time.260 The issue with the NCPs statement on the non-compliance of an enterprise is 
that it is not a requirement for the NCPs and not all of the NCPs have included this 
possibility in their Rules of Procedure of the NCPs. The possibility of the NCP to give a 
final statement recognising the possible misconduct of the enterprise would increase the 
enterprise’s willingness to cooperate in the specific instance procedure leading to a higher 
success rate of NCP mediations.  
One way to improve the effectiveness of the Guidelines would be to strengthen the NCPs 
authority through OECD policies. According to OECD “coordination on specific 
instances has been identified by NCPs as an ongoing challenge. Specific instances being 
filed with NCPs are increasing complex and the nature of global business operations, 
supply chains, investment chains, and corporate structures today has meant that 
identifying the lead NCP can be challenging. Additionally, diversity across NCPs in terms 
of their level of functionality as well as variation in procedural rules for handling specific 
instances has meant that there has not been a consistent approach to coordination”.261 In 
2018 OECD began developing a paper to answer the NCP challenges.262 This will 
hopefully lead to more sufficient coordination between NCPs. Yet, it is also necessary 
that governments are engaging in the actual practical coordination with providing the 
NCPs with appropriate amount of resources and staff, which has proved to be an issue 
with the functioning of the NCPs in conducting mediation procedures.263  
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5   Conclusions 
The globalisation has positively affected the global economy, trade and labour 
possibilities. It has also caused a change in the global governance, where the sovereign 
States are no longer the sole actors in the field of international law. However, the 
international law has not evolved in the same pace as the world. In the power play with 
the States are also international organisations and private entities such as corporations, 
sometimes larger in resources than of the States where they operate. 
 
This has caused a governance gap in the field of human rights. Numerous Non-State 
actors have the power to affect negatively the human rights of the individuals in their 
areas of operation. Even though it would be the state’s responsibility to protect the 
individuals by establishing legislation, enforcing it and providing remedy the unfortunate 
fact is that some States are not able or not willing to do it. The extraterritorial legislation 
cannot provide satisfactory results in protecting human rights due to politics and complex 
diplomatic relations to intervene in another States’ internal affairs, as well as the fact that 
it is not always clear under which jurisdiction the case at hand would actually belong. 
Even more so the international law has not recognised the responsibility to use 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, it only States that it is not forbidden for a state to conduct in 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
 
The better option to regulate the issues that are between jurisdictions setting is 
cooperation through soft law initiatives. The prime example of being able to de facto 
change national policies to be in accordance with international public interests is the 
OECD. It has established itself as an organisation that can influence the shared values of 
its Member and Non-Member States through identifications and operating through actors’ 
identifications as well as actually following-up on the together agreed policies. The 
OECD has authority over national policy-makers through its reputation as an independent 
and unbiased knowledge-producing organisation. The statistics and reports of the 
organisation have established a certain authority where there is no need to justify the 
correctness of the OECD information. OECD’s initiatives present a best practice in the 
policy-field specific and States want to aspire these goals. OECD is capable to put peer 
pressure on its members through peer reviews that it conducts. These peer reviews have 
proved to have real regulatory value as they do in fact shape the actions of the 
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participating States. It is therefore safe to say that the OECD soft law has, despite of not 
being binding, a real regulatory effect. 
 
The OECD’s Guidelines are the OECD’s answer on the responsibility gap concerning 
business and human rights. What makes the guidelines a unique mechanism for corporate 
social responsibility are the NCPs that are mandated to promote the Guidelines and handle 
specific instances. The 2011 review of the Guidelines included very important changes 
for human rights protection. First of all it is clear, that the States are responsible for 
establishing appropriate legislation and policies to protect individuals. Despite this a 
proper protection of human rights needs the actions of multinational enterprises. 
Therefore, the renewed human rights chapter of the Guidelines is important in engaging 
enterprises in human rights protection. It is crucial that the enterprises conduct human 
rights due diligence throughout their operations in host States, whether the state is willing 
or capable to establish regulation sufficient to guarantee the fulfilment of human rights in 
its territory or not.  In addition, extending the corporate responsibility to subsidiaries has 
a great value in advancing the human rights in multinational enterprise’s areas of 
operation.  
 
The NCPs that are implemented in all adhering States are responsible for promoting the 
Guidelines and handling specific instances. The NCPs have real potential to handle 
human rights cases as they can offer a valuable discussion forum for the complainant and 
the enterprise accused and provide recommendations on how to improve the corporate 
conduct to be in accordance with the Guidelines. However, as the NCP procedure is 
voluntary for an enterprise, there is no material sanctions from the part of the OECD when 
the enterprise does not participate in the process. Even though the NCPs are capable to 
provide determinations on the enterprise’s non-compliance, a minority of States have 
mandated their NCP to do so in the NCPs Rules of Procedure. In practice, including the 
possibility of giving a statement on corporate non-compliance in the Rules of Procedure 
has showed evidence on being an efficient leverage to engage enterprises in the mediation 
procedure. The NCP determination on non-compliance can also serve as a form of remedy 
for the victim of the human rights violation.   
The means to improve the Guidelines include engaging the States more into the 
implementation of the guidelines. The peer review procedure has established itself as a 
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sufficient motivator for reforms in national policies. However, the peer review procedure 
on the NCP system has only included in the procedural guidance as voluntary. The 
government engagement in establishing a functional system of corporate conduct is 
crucial. This also means more enforcement mechanisms to the NCP procedures, such as 
using leverage to make enterprises obey the guidelines and adding the possibility for the 
NCP to provide determinations on corporate breaches of the Guidelines. Efficient 
cooperation amongst States and the OECD is needed to protect individuals from wrongful 
corporate conduct.  
